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ABSTRACT
The ASEAN member countries are among the fastest growing 
developing countries in the world. Their high rate of growth during the 
past two decades and their collective efforts in world affairs have 
received growing international notice. The objective of this study is 
to examinate the extent to which economic growth resulted from regional 
integration among the ASEAN member countries.
The study of the characteristics of the ASEAN economies, their 
growth performance and their experience of economic cooperation, 
suggests that their economic achievements mainly resulted from the 
effectiveness of each country's own policies. Outward orientation 
toward world markets was key, but it was supported by relatively 
efficient macroeconomic and sectoral policies. The region had 
relatively high intra-regional trade before the formation of ASEAN, and 
such trade has persisted. However, apart from Singapore's entrepot 
trade, it principally consists of complementary trade in primary 
products which have never become heavily protected. Intra-ASEAN trade 
In manufactures has not increased appreciably, because ASEAN has not 
reduced protection substantially either among the member countries 
alone, or among the member countries and against the rest of the world. 
Econometric experiments confirmed that little would be gained by a 
preferential arrangement, and suggested that complete intra-ASEAN trade 
liberalization would also not lead to a marked increase in the ratio of 
intra-ASEAN to total ASEAN trade. Much of such an increase would, 
moreover, consist of trade diversion rather than trade creation. A 
reduction of trade barriers within ASEAN simultaneously with world wide 
trade liberalization would in contrast, lead to appreciable output and 
trade growth for the ASEAN member countries.
VGLOSSARY
ACM: Arab Common Market - Egypt, Iraq and Jordan (1963)
AEM: ASEAN Economic Ministers
AIC: ASEAN Industrial Complementation Program
AI JV: ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Projects
AIP : ASEAN Industrial Projects scheme
AP: Andean Pact - Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela (1969)
ASA: Association of Southeast-Asia - Malaya, the Philippines and 
Thailand (1961)
ASEAN: Association of South East Asia Nations - Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (1967), 
plus Brunei (1984)
ASEAN-CCI: ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry
BENELUX - Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg (1920)
CACM: Central American Common Market - Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (1960)
CARICOM: Caribbean Community - Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts-Nevis- 
Anguilla, St Lucia, St Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago 
(1973)
CARIFTA: Caribbean Free Trade Area - predecessor of above
CEAO: West African Economic Community - Ivory Coast, Mauretania, 
Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (1973)
CEPGL: Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes - 
Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (1976)
CMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and USSR (1949); Mongolia (1962); Cuba 
(1972); Vietnam (1978)
EAC: East African Community - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (1967)
EC: European Communities - Belgium, France, Federal Republic of
vi
Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands, (1957); Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United kingdom (1973); Greece (1981); Portugal, Spain 
and Turkey (1986)
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States - all those 
countries participating in UDEAC, CEAO, MRU plus some other 
West African states (1975)
E F T A : European Free Trade Association - Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland with Liechtenstein, and the United 
Kingdom (1960); Finland (1961); Iceland (1970)
L A F T A : Latin American Free Trade Association - Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (1960); Colombia 
and Ecuador (1961); Venezuela (1966); Bolivia (1967)
MRU: Mano River Union - Liberia and Sierra Leone (1973)
PTA: Preferential Trading Arrangement of the ASEAN Member
Countries
R C D : Regional Cooperation for Development - Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey
S A C U : Southern African Customs Union - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and the Republic of South Africa (1969)
S I T C : Standard International Trade Classification
U D E A C : Central African Customs and Economic Union -Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon (1966)
N o t e s : (1) All figures are in US dollars. (2) figures have been 
rounded where appropriate to avoid spurious implications of 
accuracy. Percentages in tables therefore do not always add 
to 100.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Regional integration has a long but chequered history.The German 
Zollvereins represent early form of regional integration. In more 
modern times the formation of the European Communities (EC) was 
followed by a number of integration schemes in developing countries. 
However, only the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have experienced sustained and rapid growth together with a 
regional integration program. The objective of this thesis is to 
analyse whether economic growth resulted from regional integration or 
whether it was independent of it. Since the basic argument for 
regional integration is concerned with trade,the analytical approach is 
to measure the actual and potential trade effects of the formation of 
ASEAN.
1.1 The Concept of Economic Integration
The term 'economic integration' in contrast to the concept and its 
practice, is relatively recent. Machlup (1977) was unable to find a 
single use prior to the 1940s. However, since then economic and 
regional integration have been widely used and have been variously 
defined. Franz Hartog (1953, p.165) defined economic integration as a 
"rather advanced type of cooperation, as distinct from the term 
'harmonization', which refers to a mutual consultation on important 
issues of economic policy". A somewhat similar definition was proposed 
by Robert Marjolin (1953, p.41), who suggested that "any process which 
brings about a greater degree of unity can rightly be called 
integration." In contrast, H. E. English (1974, p.19) argued that
integration is systematic cooperation, the difference between
cooperation and integration is that "the former term is used to
identify rather looser forms of association, while integration is 
reserved for more formal arrangements".
2To Jan Tinbergen (1954, p.95) , economic integration was a process 
of "the creation of the most desirable structure of international 
economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation, and 
introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coordination and 
unification".
In Myrdal's opinion (1956, p.ll), integration is a social and 
economic process destroying barriers, both social and economic, between 
the participants in economic activities".
Bela Balassa (1966, pp.24-25) defined economic integration as a 
process and a state of affairs which involves the amalgamation of 
separate economies into larger regions. It is in this more limited 
sense that the term is used today. As a process, economic integration 
encompasses various measures abolishing discrimination among economic 
units belonging to different national states; as a state of affairs, it 
can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination 
among national economies. Balassa argued that the concept of economic 
integration in a dynamic sense can not be restricted to total 
integration, but encompasses successive forms of integration, moving 
from a free-trade area, to a customs union, a common market, and an 
economic union.
Although different authors use different definitions, the common 
characteristic of economic integration is clear; that is, integration 
is systematic cooperation that requires separate nation states to give 
up some degree of sovereignty for a common purpose. The organizational 
forms representing various degrees of integration can be summarized as 
follows:
(1) preferential trade area -- member countries give each other 
preferential tariff treatment on selected or all products;
(2) free-trade area —  tariffs and quantitative restrictions among 
the member countries are abolished;
(3) customs union —  the free trade area creates a common external 
tariff against non-member countries;
(4) common market —  the customs union allows free movement of 
factors of production (labour and capital) as well as goods and 
services;
(5) economic union —  the common market combines the removal of
3restrictions on commodity's service and factor movements with the 
harmonization of some economic policies;
(6) total economic integration —  an economic union has common 
economic policies, formulated and administrated by a supranational 
authority whose decisions are binding for the member states.
(7) complete political as well as economic integration —  all the 
member countries become one nation; that is the central authority 
required for total economic integration not only controls economic 
policies, but is also responsible to a central parliament with the 
sovereignty of a nation's government (Balassa 1966, El-Agraa 1982)1.
Economic or regional integration is thus primarily an economic 
concept and this is the context in which it is studied here, but its 
political dimensions can not be ignored. The motivation for economic 
integration has often been primarily political among both industrial 
and developing countries. Success or failure must therefore not only be 
judged by economic criteria.
1.2 The Global Experience
Various forms of regional integration reflecting many economic and
political considerations have been implemented in many parts of the
world. In the 1920s, Belgium,the Netherlands and Luxembourg formed
Benelux. The centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe were the
first to form a co-operative organization, the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) after World War Two in 1949, covering trade
and production agreements. But the European Communities (EC) formed in
1957 by the Benelux members, France, the Federal Republic of Germany
oand Italy and now numbering 13 members is the most significant and 
influential integration scheme in operation to-day. During the 1960s 
the EC together with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (which 
included the principal European market oriented industrial countries 
not in the EC) contributed in an important measure to the reduction of 
barriers to trade among all market oriented industrial countries by
*A federal state has many characteristics of political and economic 
integration, but is usually not a completely integrated economic unit 
or even an economic union.
o See Glossary.
4responding to United States initiatives to free up industrial trade. 
The emphasis of the time was strongly outward oriented and the EC's 
common external tariff was formulated accordingly.
Regional economic integration also became popular among developing 
countries . In Africa, several schemes were inaugurated, but with few 
results. The East African Community (EAC) grew out of colonial 
arrangements for the running of railways, posts and telegraphs and a 
customs union including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It expanded to 
encompass an ambitious regional program, but failed to overcome the 
political differences of its three member states. A number of countries 
participated in the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), 
the West African Economic Community (CEAO), and the Mano River Union
(MRU) and together with some other west African states formed the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. The
Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) is
another African grouping. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
formed in 1969 gave landlocked Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana access 
to South African markets. Although dominated by Southern Africa it has 
been the only effective African regional arrangement to date.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, four ambitious integration 
programs were inaugurated. The Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA) and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) were formed 
on the lines of EFTA. A Central American Common Market (CACM) was 
created on the EC model in 1960 and appeared to be successful for a few 
years (Cline and Delgado, 1978), although at a very high cost in terms 
of protection and trade diversion with resulting slow growth in the 
long term and the ultimate break up of the regional integration 
arrangements. The Andean Common Market was formed in 1969 with the 
signing of the Cartagena Agreement by six LAFTA members. In 1973 the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) grew out of CARIFTA. LAFTA has grown 
slowly and with a considerable degree of trade diversion marked by 
relatively high capital intensity of intra-LAFTA trade which presumes 
trade diversion (Krueger, 1980). The other schemes have not been 
successful .
Q The overview of integration arrangements among developing countries 
is based on El-Agraa (1982), Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975), and 
Vaitsos (1978).
5Several regional organizations were also formed in Asia, including 
the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and the Arab Common 
Market (ACM), while, Egypt, Yugoslavia and India created a preferential 
arrangement. The Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) is the 
most recent and the only advanced Asian integration arrangement to 
survive4 . Indeed it has emerged as politically the strongest of 
developing country regional arrangements.
Given the proliferation of integration schemes, it is not 
surprising that the post World War Two period was referred to as 'the 
age of integration' by Haberler (1964). The enthusiasm for integration 
schemes was spurred by the EC's seeming success. It appeared that the 
arguments for integration as a mechanism for accelerating economic 
growth were validated. It was argued particularly that regional 
integration could remove some of the bottlenecks faced by developing 
countries in their industrialization ambitions.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 
concluded that "regional economic groupings, integration or other forms 
of economic cooperation should be promoted among developing countries 
as a means of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade 
and encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and 
agricultural diversification with due regard to the special features of 
development of the various countries concerned as well as their 
economic and social systems" (Final Act and Report 1964). The 
Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America even believed 
that "the common market would offer each and all of the Latin American 
countries equal opportunities of expediting their economic growth. The 
common market could play a leading role in mitigating the Latin 
American countries' vulnerability to external contingencies and 
fluctuations"(The Latin American Common Market,1959).
However, by the 1970s, integration schemes among developing 
countries were not progressing. The EAC had broken up formally. After a 
decade of apparent success, CACM was collapsing. Most of the 
integration arrangements have not been either effective or lasting
4A new South Asian cooperation movement is , however, becoming 
evident.
6(Vaitsos,1982) . Difficulties were clearly evident in Africa from the 
start. Divergent political systems were a major cause of the failure of 
EAC, while lack of administrative capacity was a critical obstacle in 
the implementation of the West African arrangements. However, most of 
the integration arrangements faced increasing difficulties for economic 
reasons.
Firstly, difficulties arose if the member countries were at 
different stages of development, because the greater the difference in 
levels of development the more difficult it was to share the costs and 
benefits of integration equitably. The greater the difference in level 
of development, the more difficulties emerged in the negotiation of 
tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions. Least developed member 
countries were afraid that by giving their partners free access to 
their market, they would impede their development rather than further 
it. The efficient operation of integrated production meant that 
projects were allocated to the country which had most labour skills, 
the most advanced technology and most efficient management. The least 
developed countries hence argued that the pursuit of maximum regional 
gains would lead to a skewed distribution of industries favouring the 
more developed member countries. Infant industries in the less 
developed countries would stagnate. Complex phasing arrangements were 
made to avoid this problem, but they were not successful.
Secondly, developing member countries of regional integration 
arrangements had similar production endowments, lacking modern 
technology and capital, and are largely rich in unskilled labour. The 
ensuing industrial structures were not conducive to a growth of mutual 
trade through specialization and the exploitation of economies of 
scale. One of the common features of developing countries in the 1950's 
and 1960's was that they had a high ratio of subsistence agriculture to 
total output and depended on one or a few primary product exports for 
their relatively low level of trade. There was little opportunity for
regional trade where such products were similar. Even where the
products differed they were more likely to be inputs into the
production mix of industrial than of developing countries. Raw
materials generally faced few trade barriers and there was thus no need 
for regional integration to stimulate trade. Developing countries at
7low stages of development needed to import small volumes of 
sophisticated industrial goods and to export labour intensive goods in 
which there was little product differentiation and hence little scope 
for intra industry trade. That is, not only were natural resource 
endowments similar, but so were factor endowments. Markets for the 
integration groupings were too small and transport costs too high to 
permit the reaping of the benefits of specialization and economies of 
scale that were the rationale of integration and worked so well at a 
higher level of development for example in the EC.
Thirdly, conflicts between national economic policies and those 
required by the integration process lead to difficulties. For example, 
Venezuela's Andean Pact industrial transactions called for a 
devaluation of the bolivar, but this policy could not be implemented 
while its balance of payments was favorable as a result of the Dutch 
Disease effects of petroleum and iron ore exports (Vaitsos,1982).
1.3 The Main Purposes of the Study
ASEAN was set up on 8 August 1967 after several attempts when the 
Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand signed the Bangkok Declaration. Brunei became the sixth member 
country in 19845 6. In contrast to failures of other developing country 
regional integration experiments, ASEAN is an active and successful
norganization, albeit mainly in political terms . It is not at all 
clear, whether the grouping has had much economic effect. The bulk of 
ASEAN member countries' trade is outside the regional arrangement, and 
most of that within the region is not the result of regional trade 
liberalization.
This study seeks to examine the economic characteristics of the 
ASEAN arrangement and analyse the effects of various possible trade 
liberalisation measures on regional trade. Chapter 2 surveys the
5The Association of Southeast-Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961 by 
Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, and MAPHILINDO embracing 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia was proposed in 1963.
Brunei is not included in this study.
^Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir at 17th ASEAN Economic Minister's 
(AEM) Meeting.
8theoretical foundations of the concept of regional integration. Chapter
3 discusses the economic characteristics of the ASEAN member countries 
and reviews the process of ASEAN economic integration to date. Chapter
4 analyses trends in the trade of ASEAN member countries. In chapter 5 
, a simulation model has been used to examine the trade effects of the 
various trade liberalization policies on ASEAN member countries. 
Chapter 6 concludes with some policy implications for ASEAN in 
particular and regional integration among developing countries in 
general.
9CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Encouragement of the formation of customs unions is well founded 
in economic theory. It has long been argued that as freer trade 
increases welfare, and as a customs union eliminated tariffs among 
member countries, the formation of a customs union was a movement 
towards free trade. A customs union thus increased welfare even if it 
was less favorable overall than general free trade.
Viner pointed out the errors of this argument. In his 1931 work 
'The Most Favoured Nation Clause', he defended the principle of 
non-discriminatory tariffs by showing the possibility of preferential 
duties causing a greater diversion of trade than uniform protection. In 
1950, he went further to point out that the primary purpose of a 
customs union and its major consequence for good or bad, was to shift 
sources of supply. Such a shift could be either to lower or to raise 
the costs of inputs, depending on circumstances (p.44). He pioneered 
the distinction between the concept of trade creation and trade 
diversion. This opened the way to the quantitative analysis of the 
economic consequences of the formation of customs unions. According to 
Viner, trade creation means the replacement of relatively high cost 
domestic production by cheaper imports from a partner, while trade 
diversion means the replacement of cheaper initial imports from the 
outside world by more expensive imports from a union partner. Viner 
considered trade creation to be 'good' and trade diversion to be 'bad', 
stressing that the formation of a customs union would be beneficial 
only when trade creation dominates over trade diversion (pp.44-46). In 
particular cases, the gains from the formation of a customs union could 
be positive or negative, depending on circumstances. He summarized the 
conditions under which a customs union was more likely to operate in 
the free-trade direction (Viner,1950, pp.51-52). These conditions 
included the following: the larger the economic area of the customs
10
union; the lower the external tariffs; the less the degree of
complementarity of the member countries with respect to protected 
industries prior to customs union; the greater the differences in 
unit-costs for the same goods produced in different member countries, 
and the potential gain from the economies of scale as well as the gains 
from further specialization.
The next major developments in customs union theory were made by 
Meade (1956), Gehrels (1956-57) and Lipsey (1960). They distinguished 
between the effects of the formation of a customs union on production 
and on consumption, although this distinction is not fully 
satisfactory, because the consumption effects will ultimately cause 
changes in production. Lipsey considered that a more satisfactory
distinction remained between inter-country substitution and inter­
commodity substitution. Viner's trade creation and trade diversion is 
inter-country substitution, since one country is substituted for 
another as supplier for some commodities when the customs union is
formed. The type of substitution analysed by Gehrels, Lipsey and Meade 
inter-commodity substitution - occurs when one commodity is 
substituted for some other commodity as a result of a relative price 
shift after the formation of custom union.
Gehrels argued that to examine a customs union in the light only 
of production effects, as Viner does, gives a biased judgment of the 
effects on countries joining the customs union. He proved that under 
certain conditions it is possible for country A to form a 
trade-diverting customs union and yet gain an increase in welfare. The 
rationale for this argument is simple. After the formation of a trade 
diverting customs union, the higher price of imported goods from the
partner country will certainly lead to some substitution between 
domestic products and imported products. The increased consumption of 
domestic products is equivalent to an increase in the benefits for the 
home country. Based on a two country and two commodity model, Gehrels 
established a general presumption in favour of gains from a custom 
union.
Lipsey (1957) argued that when a customs union was formed, some of 
the goods formerly imported from non-member countries would be replaced 
by the same goods imported from a member country, duty free but at a
11
higher real cost. The shift to a higher cost source of supply tends to 
lower the country's real income, as well as consumer welfare. However, 
consumer welfare might outweighed the increased costs resulting from 
the customs union. Hence, he claimed that "when consumption effects are 
allowed for, the simple conclusions that trade creation is 'good' and 
trade diversion 'bad' are no longer valid.
Lipsey and Lancaster published "The General Theory of Second Best" 
in 1956-57. The optimal patterns of production and consumption held 
where marginal social costs of products were equal to the marginal 
value of goods consumed. They argued that the existence of taxes, 
subsidies, monopolies, customs duties, etc., prevented the satisfaction 
of optimum conditions. Since some price distortions may offset one 
another, the removal of certain duties may make matters worse rather 
than better, that is, they may increase the distance from a 
'second-best' position. Lipsey and Lancaster came to a general 
conclusion that a small variation of any tax or duty is more likely to 
raise welfare than a large variation would. In a most instructive 1960 
survey article, Lipsey further stated the following generalizations 
with respect to customs unions:" when only some tariffs are to be 
changed, welfare is more likely to be raised if these tariffs are 
merely reduced than if they are completely removed"(Lipsey, 1960, pp. 
506-507). He pointed out" that it is an absolutely general proposition 
in the theory of second best, it applies to all sub-optimal situations 
and customs-union theory only provides a particular example of its 
application"(p.506).
In his article "Mr Gehrels on Customs Unions", Lipsey pointed out 
the shortcomings of Gehrels' model and developed a model containing 
three types of commodities: domestic commodities (A), imports from the 
union partners (B) and imports from the outside world (C). This model 
demonstrated that Gehrels' general presumption was not valid (Table 
2- 1).
Lipsey's model showed that all three optimum conditions were 
fulfilled in the case of free trade. In a uniform tariff customs union 
case, the price of goods from both B and C will be higher in A's 
domestic market than in the world market. When a customs union is 
formed, the first optimum condition is fulfilled but the third optimum
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Table 2-1: Optimum Conditions in Lipsey's Model
Free 
(col
trade 
• 1)
Uniform ad valorem 
tariff on all imports 
(col.2)
Customs Union 
with country B 
(col.3)
PAd PAi PAd PAt PAd PAi
PBd PBi PBd PBi Pbd PBi
PBd PAi PAd PAi PAd PAi
PCd PCi PCd PCi PCd PCi
PBd PBi PBd PBi PBd PBi
PCd PCi PCd PCi PCd PCi
Subscripts A, B and C refer to countries of origin, d to prices 
in A's domestic markets, and i to prices in the international 
market.
Source: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXIV(3), NO.65, 1956-57, 
pp. 211-214.
condition is no longer satisfied. Thus far Lipsey proved the 
neo-classical theories that welfare may rise or fall in a customs 
union. Further examining the conditions after formation of a customs 
union, Lipsey argued that when the tariff was taken off imports from a 
country's union partner, the relative price between these imports and 
domestic goods was brought into conformity with the real rates of 
transformation. This tends to increase welfare. On the other hand, the 
relative price between imports from the union partner and imports from 
the outside world were moved away from equality with real rates of 
transformation. This tends to reduce welfare. Lipsey therefore argued 
that what really matters is the relation between imports from the 
outside world and expenditure on domestic commodities. A customs union 
is more likely to raise welfare the higher is the proportion of trade 
with the country's union partner and the lower the proportion with the 
outside world; a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the more 
it purchases domestic commodities rather than those from the outside 
world. He regarded resource reallocation, adjustments of consumption
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patterns, and changes in the terms of trade as 'static', and economies 
of scale, changes in market structures, and changes in growth rates as 
'dynamic'.
Meade also contributed to the theory of integration through 
customs unions. In 1953 he discussed why a partial movement toward a 
wider economic union was in general preferable to a more complete 
movement toward a narrower union (p.9). He discussed the economic 
benefits from integration from three aspects: (1) maximization of 
production due to reallocation of resources, (2) optimization of trade 
due to shifts of consumption, and (3) increase in competition due to 
forced efficiency and relaxation of monopolistic restraints (p.13). In 
1955, Meade examined these welfare effects of a customs union in more 
detail. To determine whether a customs union on balance raises or 
lowers total welfare, Meade suggested that not only the total volume of 
trade creation and trade diversion, but also the size of the cost 
reductions and cost increases for each unit of traded goods, should be 
considered (p.35). This method provides a much more accurate comparison 
of the total value of all trade created. In his analysis, Meade took 
into consideration:
(1) the effects of commodity substitution (p.33);
(2) the effects of reduction of government tax revenue (pp.42-43);
(3) the effects of the tariff structure, especially the effects of 
marginal reductions in tariff (p.52);
(4) the effects of elasticity of demand and supply, as well as the 
effects of the utility of the commodity to the sellers and buyers 
(p.44 ) ;
(5) the effects due to monopoly positions, external economies and 
diseconomies in domestic trade (p.65).
Finally, Meade divided the effects of tariff changes on trade into 
three categories. Primary change is the increases in imports of 
products from a country which has been granted a preferential reduction 
or removal of tariffs (p.67); secondary change is the change in 
international trade in products in which the union partners are close 
substitutes for or close complements to, so that the trade between 
union partners is directly affected by the changes in the price 
resulting from the reduction of the tariff (p.68); and tertiary change,
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that is the adjustment of trade flows and exchange rates that are made 
necessary to restore balance in international payments (p.83).
In Meade's analysis, solutions vary from case to case, but they do 
not affect the main drift of the argument. Meade argued some 
generalizations as follows:
(1) A reduction in trade barriers which will lead in a]l cases to 
some primary expansion of trade, and on this expansion of trade there 
will almost always be some important gain.
(2) It is more likely to increase economic welfare if the 
economies of the partner countries are actually very competitive or 
similar, but potentially very complementary or dissimilar.
(3) It is more likely to increase economic welfare, the higher are 
the initial rates of duty on imports into the partner countries.
(4) It is more likely to increase economic welfare, the higher a 
proportion of trade occurs between union partners.
(5) It is more likely to increase economic welfare, the greater 
the proportion of the world's production, consumption, and trade which 
is covered by the members of the union.
(6) It is more likely to increase welfare, the lower the rate of 
import duties in the rest of the world but the greater the number of 
independent customs areas into which the rest of the world is divided.
(7) A customs union is less likely to have adverse secondary 
repercussions upon economic welfare in a world in which trade barriers 
take the form of fixed quantitative restrictions rather than taxes on 
imports.
(8) The formation of a customs union is more likely to raise 
economic welfare the greater is the scope for economies of large-scale 
production in those industries within the union which are now enabled 
to expand by undercutting similar industries in other parts of the 
union.
(9) a partial all-round reduction by the partner countries of 
their duties on each other's trade is more likely to do good and less 
likely to do harm than is the subsequent total elimination of those 
duties (for more detail see Meade 1956, pp.107-115).
Contributions to the integration literature by Prebisch (1949), 
Cooper and Massell (1965), Johnson (1965), Linder (1966), Kitamura
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(1966), and Bela Balassa and Ardy Stoutjesdijk (1975), were mainly 
concerned with the effects of customs unions on the rate of economic 
growth rather than with welfare issues. The transformation of 
traditional economies through industrialization became the main focus.
Prebisch (1949) argued that the static theory of comparative 
advantage could not be applied to developing countries. "It is true 
that the reasoning on the economic advantages of the international 
division of labour is theoretically sound, but it is usually forgotten 
that it is based upon an assumption1 which has been conclusively proved 
false by facts" (p.l). His argument was mainly based on his belief that 
a persistent deterioration of the terms of trade for primary products 
was inevitable. The industrial countries could get "the whole benefit 
of the technical development of their industries, and in addition, the 
peripheral countries transferred to them a share of the fruits of their 
own technical progress"(p .10) . These propositions are now widely 
regarded as being dubious factually, but they were and are emotionally 
appealing and Prebisch's views became very popular. Industrialization 
in developing countries was regarded as necessary to give those 
countries a share of the benefits of technical progress and to 
progressively raise standards of living and in some sense this is 
correct. But Prebisch argued strongly for protective tariffs to promote 
industrialization in developing countries and this policy was widely 
followed in the 1950s and the 1960s. By completely ignoring the 
similarity of factor endowments among developing countries, Prebisch 
missed the opportunities for specialization and economies of scale that 
were already opening up in trade in manufactures between developing and 
industrial countries. From a dynamic and development point of view this 
was to prove the most important developmental aspect of trade. But 
Prebusch's argument again had emotional appeal and thus opened up a new 
approach to customs union proposals.
Cooper and Massell (1965) followed in this general direction, 
introducing industrial production as a new dimension of the analysis. 
They also assumed that economic planners in a developing country would
According to this assumption, the benefits of technical progress 
tend to be distributed alike over the whole community, either by the 
lowering of prices or the corresponding raising of incomes.
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be willing to accept some reduction in national income to achieve an 
increase in industrial production (p.462). That is, accelerated 
industrial development could be traded off against a loss of national 
income. This concept gives rise to a stepped supply curve of industrial 
production as a function of national income foregone. A demand curve is 
added to this supply analysis to represent a government's desire for 
industrialization. The optimal level of industrialization is determined 
by the intersection of the demand and supply curve. Corresponding to 
this level of industrialization is a set of tariffs that provide enough 
protection for each industry (figure 2-1). The formation of a customs 
union between two countries enables the pooling of a market, hence 
permitting some degree of specialization.
In this model, trade creation and trade diversion can be good or 
bad; the gains from a customs union depend on what happens to income 
and industrial output. This in turn depends on the common external 
tariff chosen, and on the national trade-off between industrialization 
and national income. The conclusions drawn by Cooper and Massel 1 were 
that the potential gain from a customs union would be larger if: (1) 
there were a steeply rising marginal cost of protection in the two 
countries, (2) the countries had a strong preference for industry, (3) 
the countries were complementary, and (4) neither country dominated the 
other in industrial production. They also noted that even if the fourth 
condition did not obtain, gains could still be obtained from forming a 
partial union (an arrangement allowing protection within a customs 
union, that is a common external tariff, but not internal free trade) 
or from some other device that interfered with free trade within the 
customs union.
A somewhat similar approach was adopted by Johnson (1965). He 
viewed customs unions as a means of lowering the excess costs of 
industrial production which was desired for reasons of national policy 
and might be required for non-economic reasons. He made three major 
assumptions:
(1) Governments use trade barriers to achieve certain non-economic 
objectives.
(2) Government actions are aimed at offsetting differences between 
private and social costs.
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(3) Governments have a preference for industrial production.
Given such assumptions, the prospective gains from tariff 
reduction for each union of countries lies in the expansion of exports 
of industrial products. Therefore, discriminatory reciprocal tariff 
reduction costs each partner country less, in terms of the reduction in 
domestic industrial production incurred per unit cost increase in 
partner industrial production, than does non-discriminatory reciprocal
ptariff reduction. The generalizations of Johnson's analysis are:
(1) Customs union partners may gain from both trade creation and 
trade diversion.
(2) Trade diversion is preferable to trade creation for the 
preference granting countries since a sacrifice of domestic industrial 
production is not required.
(3) both trade creation and trade diversion may lead to increased 
efficiency if economies of scale are present.
Linder (1966) also considered economic integration among 
developing countries as a way of extending import substitution on a 
regional scale. He evaluated the effects of regional integration among 
developing countries mainly in terms of an improved environment for 
economic growth. His argument lay in dynamic aspects of comparative 
advantage, exploitation of more efficient allocation of resources, 
economies of scale and further specialization within the region, as 
well as learning and competition effects. It was argued that in a 
dynamic context, the cost of import substitution or industrialization 
will fall and the pace of growth will increase. All these arguments 
stressed those possibilities which could overcome industrialization 
difficulties, assuming that industrialization was more important than 
rising income. The arguments thus explored a second best case. Linder 
(1966) moreover, followed Prebisch (1949) in arguing that customs union 
theory derived from a traditionally accepted theory of international 
trade could not be readily applied to trade problems of developing 
countries. He argued that the chief obstacle to raw material exports of 
developing countries was the low price and low income elasticity of 
demand for such commodities. In the case of manufactures, the obstacle
^Summarized by El-Agraa,1982.
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stemmed not so much from the demand situation abroad as from the supply 
situation at home. He thought that the export difficulties of the 
developing countries were structural. Hence, the factors that 
determined developing countries future foreign exchange earnings were 
largely beyond their control. He also completely ignored the 
opportunities for trade inherent in the differences in factor endowment 
between developing and industrial countries. In his view developing 
countries thus faced a 'foreign-exchange gap'. He stressed that through 
the formation of customs unions among developing countries, the member 
countries would benefit from a more efficient allocation of existing 
and future productive resources than was possible in individual 
countries, so that the member countries would be able to create a 
competitive environment of reasonably sized production units. He also 
stressed that customs unions would enable developing countries to 
maintain restrictions on non-input imports from industrial countries, 
thereby, enhancing capacity utilization and growth. Linder's argument, 
like Prebisch's, thus turns out to be based on an erroneous balance of 
payments hypothesis.
Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975) pointed out much more 
realistically than the 'industrialization' proponents of regional 
integration that economic integration among developing countries was 
principally a way of extending import substitution, and was hence 
subject to serious limitations. Regional integration oriented towards 
import substitution would likely lead to the establishment of 
inefficient plants and of an inefficient industrial structure, thereby 
postponing the time and increasing the difficulties of a reorientation 
of policies outwards. They suggested that regionai economic integration 
should be regarded as one of the policy options available to developing 
countries in pursuing their strategy for economic development. Its 
potential benefits and costs should be weighed against other policy 
options, and in particular against a one country export-oriented 
strategy. According to Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, the balance of 
benefits and costs of regional integration in a particular case will 
depend on market size, resource endowment, geographic location, and 
access to industrial country markets as well as on the domestic 
policies followed. They noted that measures that would ensure the
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equitable distribution of the benefits and costs of integration among 
the member countries of a regional arrangement would have to be taken 
if such an arrangement were to survive.
It is clear from the literature that although some gains may 
result from the formation of a customs union or regional integration 
scheme in a highly protectionist world environment, in a reasonably 
liberal trading environment global trade will always be a superior 
option to regional trade. An outward-looking strategy that focuses on 
world markets will therefore be preferable to regional integration. 
Similarly, if there is a possibility of entering the world market by 
setting up industrial projects based on economies of scale by producing 
for a world wide market, regional integration will be an inferior 
option from the economic point of view. These conclusions are 
strengthened in a dynamic context which takes the differential factor 
endowments between developing and industrial countries into account.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN
3.1 The Motivations for the Formation of ASEAN
%Political and security considerations were the main reason for the 
formation of ASEAN. The region had a turbulent history in the 1950s. 
Emergency in Malaysia was followed by Indonesia's 'confrontation' 
policy against Malaysia and Singapore and U.S involvement in Indochina 
made the situation even more tense. ASEAN was formed to counteract 
these tensions. It was hoped that an ASEAN regional stance would 
persuade the major powers not to intervene in the region and so prevent 
the area from being converted into an arena for major power rivalry and 
conflict. By using 'collective efforts', the ASEAN member countries 
would be able to control their own destinies and sort out their own 
problems without major power intervention. It was also hoped that a 
formal ASEAN institutional framework would promote stability among the 
member countries and resolve conflicts among them efficiently.
However political cooperation is not overtly the primary objective 
of ASEAN. Formally, it is an organization to promote social and 
economic development , cultural cooperation and common political 
interests. Among these, economic cooperation takes the limelight. It 
was stressed as one of the main objectives of ASEAN from the very 
beginning. The Bangkok Declaration laid the principles for regional 
cooperation as being: "to accelerate the economic growth, social
progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavour 
in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast-Asian 
nations; to promote regional peace and stability....; to promote active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in 
the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and
administrative fields; .... to collaborate more effectively for the
greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion
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of their trade including the study of problems of international 
commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and 
communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of the 
people"(Dow Jones, 1979, pp. 7-8).
The advantages of economic integration in the ASEAN region have 
long been discussed by the member countries. It was hoped that through 
the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, intra-regiona 1 trade 
would be stimulated. It was also hoped that potential static gains 
could be achieved by re-organizing markets and production from existing 
to new and extended productive facilities and that dynamic gains could 
be achieved by expanding facilities and improving efficiency, and thus 
increasing economic growth among the member countries. It was also 
believed that ASEAN regional integration would improve the bargaining 
power of the member countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world, so as to 
obtain a higher share of the benefits of international economic 
transactions for ASEAN members countries.
3.2 The Development of ASEAN Regional Economic Cooperation
Although ASEAN has been in existence since 1967 and economic 
cooperation was stressed as one of the main objectives of the Bangkok 
Declaration, economic integration* was only initiated at the Bali 
Summit in 1976. Two documents were signed during the Bali Summit, the 
declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. These two documents have an important bearing on ASEAN 
economic relations. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord sets forth the 
principles for ASEAN cooperation by stressing cooperation in basic 
commodities, especially food and energy; industrial planning; 
intra-ASEAN trade; and a joint approach to international commodity 
problems and other world economic issues, the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation formally stresses the importance of regional resilience; 
cooperation and solidarity. The Bali Summit also paved the way for 
economic cooperation by establishing a Central Secretariat for
^Economic integration of ASEAN member countries follows the path 
suggested by the Robinson Report, United Nations Development Planning 
No. 7. 1973
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cooperative planning. The most important areas of ASEAN economic 
cooperation to merge were mutual trade liberalization and common 
industrial planning, that is, steps toward integration.
3.2.1 Preferential Trading Arrangements
Like other developing countries, ASEAN member countries considered 
trade liberalization within the ASEAN framework to be the keystone of 
regional actions. The first step in stimulating intra- ASEAN trade was 
the establishment of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA). 
The agreement was signed on 24th February 1977. The scheme was designed 
to facilitate, promote and expand intra-ASEAN trade. The instruments of 
this trade expansion included:
(1) long term quantity contracts in basic commodities subject to 
negotiated agreements by contracting parties;
(2) financial support at preferential interest rates;
(3) preference in procurement by government entities;
(4) extension of tariff preferences; and
(5) liberalization of non-tariff measures on a preferential basis.
The first batch of 71 items under PTA came into effect from 1
January 1978. At the end of 1984, over 18,000 items were covered by 
preferential treatment. The margin of preference granted was 10% in 
1978. It was raised to 20%-25% in 1981 and a small number of items were 
raised to 40%-50% in 1983. Initially, tariff reductions were negotiated 
product-by-product. In 1980, an agreement was reached for across-the 
-board tariff cuts of 20% to 25% to be applied to the items with an 
import value of less than $50,000. The ceiling was raised
subsequently, initially to $500,000 in 1981, ultimately to $10 million 
in 1983.
The across-the-board approach has avoided some of the problems of 
the selective approach. Administrative delays were reduced. The number 
of commodities subject to preference was accordingly substantially 
increased. However, the success of the PTA should not be judged by the 
number of items, but rather by its real effects on intra-ASEAN trade. 
Several studies have showen that the practical impact of PTA on 
intra-ASEAN trade was negligible. The effect of a 10% across-the-board 
tariff cut resulted in a less than 2% increase in total intra-ASEAN 
trade (Naya 1980, PP.22-23). Using a seven digit SITC product analysis,
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the trade creation effects of a 20% across-the-board tariff cut with an 
import value under $ 50,000, were negligible for both the Philippines 
(0.06%) and Thailand (0.02%) (Ooi 1981,P.20). It should never have been 
expected that the PTA would significantly increase intra-ASEAN trade. 
There was a tendency to offer irrelevant items for concessions or to 
break down one item into detailed variants to increase the number of 
items for cosmetic purposes; the ceiling of across-the-board tariff 
cuts was low, so that, only a small percentage of total imports was 
included in the program; the rate of tariff reduction was too low to 
permit a considerable increase in import demand; the price elasticities 
of import demand of the commodities included in the tariff cuts was not 
sufficiently high, so that a small change in import prices did not lead 
to large change in import demand; across-the-board tariff cuts usually 
ended up on the list of 'sensitive items' and were thus excluded from 
the preferential list (Reiger, 1985). A closer examination of the 
distribution of products included in the PTA list indicates that ASEAN 
countries concentrate their tariff cuts on three broad product 
categories - organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals,and machinery 
(Tan,1982) - because they were not competitive in these products and
did not expect to become competitive for some time. Thus, the long-term 
effect of the PTA was to encourage changes in the structure of the 
ASEAN countries' industries to generate more complementarity through 
the specialization of production, particulary in intermediate products. 
Until such changes began to occur, it was unlikely that tariff 
reductions would be able to generate significant increases in 
intra-ASEAN trade. This would mean moving in a trade diversion 
direction to increase intra-ASEAN trade. But the principal gains from 
trade come through specialization and competition which improves the 
efficiency of firms and thus leads to trade creation. Deeper tariff 
cuts on products such as textiles would be necessary to increase both 
intra-industry trade within ASEAN and raise efficiency so as to lower
costs.
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3.2.2 Industrial Co-operation
Industrial cooperation is the second main aspect of ASEAN's 
economic program. Industrial cooperation is not only thought to provide 
an impetus for further industrial growth, but also to stimulate the 
growth of intra-regional trade. The three main programs of industrial 
cooperation are:
(1) The ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) scheme.
(2) The ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) program.
(3) The ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) projects.
Shortly after the Bali Summit, the first package of AIP was 
approved by the ASEAN Economic Ministers in Kuala Lumpur in March 1976. 
Under the AIP scheme each member country is allocated a large scale 
industrial project: urea projects for Indonesia and Malaysia; a diesel 
engine project for Singapore; a superphosphate project for the
Philippines; and a soda-ash project for Thailand. Each of these 
projects required an investment of about $250 million to $300 million, 
with the host country taking up 60% and the remained 40% being shared 
among the other member countries. The progress of the AIP program has 
been limited. The Indonesian urea plant has been completed and that in 
Malaysia has made progress. The soda ash plant in Thailand has yet to 
proceed past the feasibility phase. The two projects allocated to the 
Philippines and Singapore have been withdrawn. The Philippines 
superphosphate plant ran into material supply problem. Indonesia 
claimed a threat to its mechanical industry from the Singapore diesel 
engine project. The Philippines selected copper fabrication as a
substitute and Singapore has proposed the manufacture of hepatitis B 
vaccine - clearly not a 'basic' industry - as its project.
The Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation was signed 
in October 1980. A key provision of the Agreement is to entrust the 
ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) with the task of 
identifying appropriate products or industries which could be included 
in an AIC package. The process of approving AIC projects requires 
interaction between the ASEAN-CCI and the ASEAN Governments. Thus the 
whole process is extremely time consuming. Another difficulty in the 
AIC project is that any intended project requires at least four of the 
five member countries' participation. Thus, by 1982, only two
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packages, involving automobile parts and components,had been processed 
sufficiently to be proposed by the ASEAN- CCI. Neither was considered 
workable or acceptable to the ASEAN Governments.
ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Projects are designed as private 
sector equivalents to the AIP. A Basic Agreement was signed in November 
1983. A distinguishing feature of AIJVs is that they can proceed even 
with only two ASEAN partners from the private sector. Thus, it is 
easier to formulate a project under the AIJV program. It is also 
believed that AIJVs can be launched as small projects with low capital 
investment and risk. They can be approved individually, or separately, 
by the relevant ASEAN Economic Ministers, avoiding the cumbersome 
institutional machinery required for an AIC project. According to the 
Agreement, an AIJV project involving at least two investors from ASEAN 
member countries holding a combined 51% minimum equity would qualify 
for a 50% tariff cut within the participating countries. Three years 
after an AIJV begins production, all ASEAN countries will allow imports 
of the product at a minimum preferential tariff margin of 5%. The 
tariff can be zero if government so decide. In May 1984, 21 AIJV 
projects proposed by ASEAN businessmen were approved at the sixteenth
PASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting held in Jakarta . Implementation since 
then, however, has been slow.
3.3 The Major Features of ASEAN Economies and of Their Economic 
Relations
The ASEAN membership does not consist of a homogeneous group of 
countries. The member countries differ in terms of colonial heritage, 
culture, languages, religions, history and traditions . Great disparity 
also exists among the member countries in respect of physical area, 
population, natural resource and stages of economic development. 
Geographically, there are marked differences among them (Table 3-1). At 
one extreme, Singapore is a city-state with an area of 1000 square 
Kilometers and a 2.5 million population. At the other extreme lies 
Indonesia, the largest country with 1,919 thousands of square 
kilometers and a 155.7 million population. The Philippines, Thailand
The tariff concessions that would be appropriate were not specified.
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and Malaysia lie between these extreme. Economically, the ASEAN member 
countries adopted different growth strategies , and now they are at 
widely different stages of development. Singapore, one of the newly 
industrializing countries,had the highest per capita income of $6,620 
in 1983; Malaysia ranked second with a per capita income of $1,860; 
Thailand and the Philippines followed with a per capita income of $820 
and $760 respectively; Indonesia was at the lowest end of the scale 
with an annual per capita income of $560. Furthermore, Indonesia is 
rich in natural resources, but poor in skill and technology; its 
foreign exchange earnings largely depend on primary product exports and 
its industrialization is based on a inward-looking strategy. Singapore 
is poor in natural resources, but rich in skills. Its economy is 
relatively capital and skill intensive and heavily export-oriented with 
an outward-looking development strategy. Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand are all relatively rich in natural resources, but their 
economies have developed at different paces, with differing emphasis on 
export orientation. The rate at which traditional export commodities 
are gradually being joined by exports of manufactured goods differ.
Table 3-1: Basic Indicators - ASEAN Member Countries
Population Area GNP
(millions) Growth Rage (Thousands Per Capita
mid-1983 (percent) of Square ($)
65-73 73-83 Kilometers) 1983
Indonesia 155.7 2.1 2.3 1919 560
Malaysia 14.9 2.6 2.4 330 1860
Phi1ippines 52.1 2.9 2.7 300 760
Singapore 2.5 1.8 1.3 1 6620
Thai land 49.2 2.9 2.3 514 820
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 1985
The ASEAN leaders were fully aware of their diversities and 
accordingly took a cautious approach to economic cooperation and
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particularly to integration. As each ASEAN member country pursues its 
industrialization policy independently from the others, and because 
this state of affairs is likely to continue for a long time, it is 
recognized within the region that the formation of a customs union 
along the lines of the EC would be inappropriate for ASEAN at this 
time. The ASEAN member countries follow a flexible and open-ended 
approach, without a specific time frame for a targeted level of trade 
liberalization. They have set a long-term objective for a free trade 
area, but each member country is to retain its own tariff structure 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world for the foreseeable future. Hence, the 
ASEAN organization only provides a mechanism for the member countries 
to liberalize intra-regional trade at a speed and in a direction which 
are acceptable to all member countries (Wong, 1985). This flexible and 
open-ended approach contributes greatly to 'ASEAN solidarity' by 
avoiding conflicts over policy and sovereignty.
A slow pace of economic cooperation was particularly important in 
the early period. The first ten years of existence constituted a period 
of mutual understanding and the nurturing of consensus. There was no 
real progress toward economic cooperation in the early years, but the 
ASEAN countries made significant progress in political cooperation 
during this period. These achievements could contribute to a greater 
degree of economic cooperation and even to integration in a later 
period. Within the region slow initial progress is not regarded as a 
defect but as an important component of success. "In fact one of the 
major reasons why ASEAN could have survived such a long period and 
grown is its reliance on the low-keyed tactic of gradual advance 
towards regional cooperation, avoiding drastic action that defies 
consensus. That is perhaps the 'Southeast Asian way' and might well be 
the only way to achieve lasting regionalism in a region characterized 
by enormous differences in national interests and expectations" (Wong, 
1979, pp.4-5).
Consensus is the mechanism adopted by the ASEAN member countries 
to deal with their diversities. It has been considered indispensable 
for the growth of ASEAN. All major decisions of ASEAN have been made by 
consensus. In practice, consensus involves time consuming negotiations 
and slow progress in implementation. However, the consensus mechanisms
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greatly contribute to the equitable distribution of costs and benefits 
arising from cooperation and integration schemes. The consensus process 
is required so that all member countries share fairly in the benefits 
of cooperation and no one need make disproportionate sacrifices, thus 
insuring the acceptance and the implementation of the cooperation 
programs.
Although, there is a spectrum of incomes within the grouping, 
variance in economic and political conditions, and different 
development strategies, the ASEAN member countries also have important 
common features when they are compared with other regional groupings. 
Except for the Philippines, the ASEAN economies developed very rapidly 
during the last two decades (Table 3-2). All the ASEAN member countries 
belong to the middle-income economic group (according to World Bank 
classification) with Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in the 
lower middle-income group, while Malaysia and Singapore are in the 
upper middle-income group. During 1965-73, the average annual growth 
rate of GDP ranged from 5.4% for the Philippines to 13% for Singapore. 
Although Malaysia and the Philippines had relatively low growth, it was 
higher than that of all developing and the industrial market economies. 
During 1973-83, the growth rates of all the ASEAN member countries 
surpassed those of the industrial market economies, and they were also 
higher than those of other middle income countries in their respective 
groupings.
One of the most significant features of all the ASEAN member 
countries (except Singapore) is the importance of agriculture in the 
economy and the economic development. As Tables 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 show, 
a large percentage of the population is dependent on agriculture for 
income and employment. For the period of 1965-83, the average 4% real 
annual growth rate of agricultural output in the four ASEAN member 
countries has exceeded their population growth rates. Compared to other 
middle-income economies, this performance is also outstanding. Rapid 
growth of agriculture contributed markedly to ASEAN industrialization, 
provided exports (both food and agricultural raw materials) and 
supplied non-agricu1tural sectors with 'surplus' labour and capital. It 
also provided a growing market for non-agricultural consumer and 
producer goods and services. More importantly, with an adequate food
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Table 3-2: Average Annual Real Growth Rate of GDP 
(percent)
1965-73 1973-83
All middle-income economies 7.1 4.7
Lower middle-income economies 6.6 4.1
Upper middle-income economies 7.4 4.9
All industrial market economies 4.7 2.4
ASEAN member countries:
Indonesia 8.1 7.0
Malaysia 6.7 7.3
Philippines 5.4 5.4
Singapore 13.0 8.2
Thailand 7.8 6.9
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 1985
supply, the government could maintain the peaceful political
environment that is a prerequist for development.
Changes in economic structure are other important indicators of 
ASEAN economic development (Table 3-3). During the last two decades, 
the annual growth rates of manufacturing industries were higher than 
the average growth rates in the other sectors (Table 3-4). As a result, 
except in Indonesia, the share of industry in GDP surpassed 
agriculture. The total share of agriculture in GDP declined
particularly in Malaysia and Thailand. Employment moved in the same 
d i rection.
The ASEAN member countries' high growth performance in the past
Otwo decades can be traced to many interrelated factors . First and
o The conclusions in these paragraphs are largely based on Riedel, 
1985 and Hughes, 1985b
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T a b le  3 - 3 :  The D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  GDP by S e c t o r s
( p e r c e n t )
O ther
A g r i c u l t u r e  I n d u s t r y  M a n u fa c tu re  S e r v i c e s
1960 1983 1960 1983 1960 1983 1960 1983
I n d o n e s i a 54 26 6 26 8 13 32 35
M a la y s ia 36 21 9 16 9 39 46 44
P h i l i p p i n e s 26 22 8 11 20 25 46 42
S i n g a p o re 4 1 6 13 12 24 79 62
T h a i l a n d 40 23 6 8 13 19 41 50
S ourc e :  WorJ_d D eve lopme n t  R e p o r t , World Bank, 1979 and 1985
Tab le  3 - 4 :  P r o d u c t i o n  Growth Rate
( p e r c e n t )
A g r i c u l t u r e  I n d u s t r y  M a n u fa c tu r e s  S e r v i c e s
65-73 73-83 65-73 73-83 65-73 73-83 65-73 73-83
I n d o n e s i a 4 .8 3 .8 13.4 8 .6 9 . 0 12 .6 9 .6 9 .0
M a la y s ia - 4 .4 - 8 .7 - 1 0 . 6 ( a ) - 8 .2
P h i l i p p i n e s 4.1 4 .3 7 .4 6 .4 8 .5 5 . 0 4 . 8 5 .2
S i n g a p o re 5 .7 1.5 17.6 8 .5 19 .5 7 .9 11.5 8 .1
T h a i ] and 5 .2 3 .8 9 .0 9 . 0 11.4 8 . 9 9 .1 7 .6
M idd le -
Income 3 .3 2 .5 9 .1 4 .9 9 .3 4 . 9 7 . 5 5 .3
Economies
( a ) :  Data  f o r  1970-82
S ource :  Worvld Development  Repor t , World Bank, 1985
f o r e m o s t  a r e  e f f e c t i v e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  A l th o u g h ,  government  p o l i c i e s
32
Table 3-5: The Distribution of Employment by Sectors
(percent)
Agriculture Industry Services
1960 1981 1960 1981 1960 1981
Indonesia 75 58 8 12 17 30
Malaysia 63 50 12 16 25 43
Philippines 61 46 15 17 24 37
Singapore 8 2 23 39 69 58
Thai1 and 84 76 4 9 12 15
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 1979 and 1985
vary from country to country, the following similarities can be seen 
among the ASEAN member countries. All the ASEAN countries provided an 
environment of relatively reasonable civil order and the rule of law. 
In economic terms the ASEAN member countries did not pursue 
import-substitution to extremes, but turned to export-oriented 
development, particularly in manufacturing industries, at relatively 
early stages, that is by the end of 1960s. Only the Philippines and 
Indonesia lagged behind the group in the early 1970's in this respect. 
The level of net effective protection was lower than in most other 
developing countries. Even in the Philippines protection was not as 
high as in most developing countries, notably the members of regional 
integration groupings in Latin America. Export-oriented policies led to 
a relatively efficient allocation of resources, enabled ASEAN member 
countries access to a worldwide market, and exploited factor endowments 
without being subject to demand constraints for specialization. 
Export-oriented strategies exposed domestic industry to world market 
competition and thus both fostered industries with a lower cost and 
higher quality of products and imposed cost consciousness on economic 
planning and policy choices. The favorable policy for exports resulted 
in rapid export growth and foreign exchange earning, thus, relaxing the 
foreign exchange constraint on development. Export-oriented strategies
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also exerted a pressures for prudent monetary and exchange rate 
policies which kept prices relatively stable. Hence, the ASEAN 
economies were less distorted than those of most other developing 
countries.
The ASEAN member countries had relatively high rates of investment 
(Table 3-6). Investment was backed by relatively high savings ratios 
which reflected the development oriented mix of macro and micro 
economic policies. Domestic savings were, moreover, supplemented by 
capital import policies which for the most part took into account the 
economies' capacity to service external debt. Except in the Philippines 
(and in some instances in Indonesia), the overall developmental 
character of economic policies led to relatively effective investment, 
Government policies also strongly supported cost recovery in the public 
sector.
Because agricultural progress and employment creation was 
relatively more successful in the ASEAN member countries (except in the 
Philippines), than in most other developing countries (Riedel, 1985) 
and public goods were less skewed against lower income groups than in 
most other developing countries, poverty alleviation was more 
successful than in other developing countries, contributing to 
stabi1ity.
Finally, the formation of ASEAN contributed to regional stability 
and thus also contributed to economic development.
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Table 3-6: Savings and Investment as a Share of GNP
in ASEAN Member Countries
(percent)
Gross Domestic 
Investment as 
a Share of GNP
Gross
Saving
Share
Domestic 
as a 
of GNP
1965 1983 1965 1983
Indonesia 7 24 6 20
Malaysia 18 34 23 29
Philippines 21 27 21 21
Singapore 22 45 10 42
Thailand 20 25 19 20
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 1985
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CHAPTER 4
GROWTH AND DIRECTION OF ASEAN TRADE
4.1 Characteristics of ASEAN Trade
The rapid growth of ASEAN economies (Table 3-4) was accompanied by 
a more than proportional increase in their merchandise trade (Table 
4-1)1. Except for Singapore, these countries are richly endowed with 
natural resources and hence are net exporters of food, agricultural raw 
materials, minerals, fuels and metals. In 1981, these commodities 
ranged from 95% of exports for Indonesia to 53% for the Philippines. 
Even for Singapore, because of its entrepot role, more than 40% of
pmerchandise exports were raw materials (Tables 4-2 and 4-3) . But the 
export structure of the ASEAN member countries changed between 1967 and 
1981, reflecting successful industrialization (except in Indonesia). 
Within primary products, the share of fuels, minerals, and metals 
increased greatly, while that of other primary products decreased. 
However, the most important change lay in the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to exports. In 1981. the share of manufactured to 
total exports ranged from 25% in the Philippines3 to 50% in Singapore. 
High petroleum exports made Indonesia an exception with only 5% of 
exports consisting of manufactured goods. The growth of manufactured 
exports was greatest in Thailand. In Malaysia there was little change 
in the share of manufactures in exports because of the increased price 
and volume of petroleum. Moreover, processed raw materials were an 
important component of manufactured exports in Malaysia even in 1981.
*A1though trade in service has been growing in importance in ASEAN 
trade, the trade analysis is conducted in merchandise terms because 
service trade data are limited and not available by direction of trade.
2It was not possible to separate Singapore entrepot from total trade 
for this analysis.
O The Philippines figure is under estimated, because of the special 
treatment which Philippine statistics give to SITC 931, which are 
almost entirely labour intensive manufactures.
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The ASEAN member countries remain net importers of manufactured 
goods. Except for the Philippines imports of manufactures constituted 
over 50% of the individual ASEAN member countries imports in 1981. 
During 1967-1981, the value of imports of fuel and capital goods 
increased , but imports of food and other primary commodities fell. 
These trends are closely related to the successful agricultural, 
industrialization and overall economic expansion policies of the ASEAN 
member countries.
Table 4-1: ASEAN Member Countries' Trade Growth
Total Trade Real
Average
Growth
Annual 
Rate (%)
1967 
(Sbi1)
1983 
(Sbi1)
Export
65-73 73-83
Import
65-73 73-83
Indonesia 1.4 37.5 11.1 1.4 13.9 9.8
Malaysia 2.3 27.4 8.0 4.9 4.4 7.3
Philippines 1.7 12.9 4.2 7.5 3.1 1.3
Singapore 2.2 50.0 11.0 9.8
Thailand 1.4 16.6 6.9 9.0 4.4 3.3
Total 9.0 144.4 (8.2) (5.7) (7.1) (5.4)
Source: Worl^d Development Report, 1979, 1985
4.2 Direction of ASEAN Trade
Although the principal industrial countries are the main trading 
partners for the ASEAN member countries (Tables 4-4 and 4-5), the ratio 
of trade with industrial countries is lower than for most developing 
countries. It is particularly low for Singapore and Malaysia, because 
of the weight of regional refined petroleum trade products in their 
export baskets. However, the overall trend does not hold for 
manufactured goods, for which, as in other developing countries, the 
industrial countries are the major trading partners.
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Table 4-2: Commodity Composition of Merchandise Exports
(percent)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Raw Materials(a)
1967 96.0 70.2 94.3 65.1 93.8
1981 94.7 71.9 53.4 42.7 66.3
Manufactured Goods(b)
1967 4.0 28.9 5.6 31.1 5.2
1981 5.0 27.6 25.2 49.7 31.9
(a) : SITC 0-4
(b) : SITC 5-8 minus 6.8
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1967-1981.
Table 4-3: Commodity Composition of Merchandise Imports
(percent)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Raw Materials(a)
1967 10.4 45.7 35.2 54.7 18.5
1981 28.5 33.9 41.2 45.8 39.8
Manufactured Goods(b)
1967 89.2 52.1 63.0 43.2 75.6
1981 70.9 65.5 45.9 53.1 56.2
(a) : SITC 0-4
(b) : SITC 5-8 minus 6.8
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1967-1981.
Among the industrial countries, Japan is the largest and the 
United States is the second largest overall trading partner. Trade 
between the United States and individual ASEAN countries has undergone
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Table 4-4: Share of Imports of the ASEAN Member Countries
to Principal Industrial Countries,1981
(percent)
Exports
Imports Japan United States EEC(ten) Total
Indonesia 31 17 15 63
Malaysia 22 15 12 49
Philippines 19 26 10 55
Singapore 19 14 10 43
Thailand(a) 21 19 13 53
(a): Data for Thailand is 1980.
Source: Year Book of International Trade s ta t i^s t j. c s , 1981
Table 4-5: Share of Exports from the ASEAN Member Countries
to Principal Industrial Countries, 1981
(percent)
Imports
Exports Japan United States EEC(ten) Total
Indonesia 47 27 5 79
Malaysia 19 10 13 42
Philippines 22 34 16 72
Singapore 10 17 11 38
Thailand(a) 15 14 26 55
(a): Data for Thailand is 1980.
Source: Year Book of International Statistics, 1981
geographical changes during the last decade. Traditionally, the 
Philippines had been the largest market for American goods and the most 
important ASEAN exporter to the American market. However, for imports,
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it has been replaced by Singapore4 . This change largely results from 
the role played by American transnational corporations. They imported 
industrial raw materials and intermediate products from the United 
States for further processing in ASEAN member countries, particularly 
in Singapore, and then exported the final products to the American 
markets. On the export side, Indonesia has taken over the Philippines' 
position as the most important ASEAN exporter to the American market 
since 1974 . This change mainly results from U.S imports of petroleum 
from Indonesia (Saw and Hong, 1982).
The EC ranked third as an ASEAN trading partner. It was the most 
important export market for Thailand. Figure 4-1 shows the share of 
trade with the three major trading partners as percentages of total 
ASEAN trade from 1968 to 1980. The share for all these three trading 
partners reached its peak in 1972, the decline reflected rising 
commodity prices.
The ASEAN member countries' trade structure reflects the high 
complementarity of natural endowment (land) and the other principal 
factors of production (labour and capital ) to the factor endowment of 
industrial countries. Table 4-6 shows the commodity composition of 
ASEAN trade with the three major trading partners. Imports are highly 
concentrated in manufactured goods, notably capital goods including 
machinery and transport equipment, while agricultural and mineral raw 
materials such as crude petroleum and petroleum products, rubber, tin, 
copper, sugar, palm oil and coffee and labour intensive manufactures 
are the principal exports.
Book of International Trade Statistics,1975 shows that total 
Singapore imports from the United States reached $360 million in 1971, 
while Philippines' imports from the United States were $327 million.
5In 1974, Indonesia's total exports to the United States reached $1.6 
billion , while the total exports of the Philippines to the United 
States were $1.2 billion.
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Table 4-6: Commodity Composition of ASEAN Trade With Major
Trading Partners, 1981
Imports Share of 
Manufactured 
Products 
(percent)
Exports Share of 
Primary 
Products 
(percent)
Indonesia
Japan 94 99
U.S. 79 98
EEC 93 71
Malaysia
Japan 96 85
U.S. 87 42
EEC 87 56
Philippines
Japan 82 72
U.S. 50 36
EEC 78 55
Singapore
Japan 96 43
U.S. 86 17
EEC 88 23
Thailand
Japan 93 79
U.S. 63 40
EEC 77 60
Notes: Manufactured products include SITC 5-8 minus 6.8;
Primary products include SITC 0-4.
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1967-1981.
4.3 Intra-ASEAN Trade
Intra-ASEAN trade existed long before the formation of ASEAN in 
1967. It has not progressed very much since then, especially in the 
period before 1974. when the share of intra-ASEAN in total ASEAN trade 
in fact consistently decreased. Only after 1974, did the share of 
intra-ASEAN in the total ASEAN trade grow steadily, mainly as a result 
of increased petroleum prices. The 1981 intra-ASEAN share was 
nevertheless still below the level of 1968. The implementation of the 
PTA in 1977 had no effect on intra-ASEAN trade which stagnanted at
42
about 15% of total ASEAN trade (Figure 4-2). Compared with the EC in 
which regional trade constitutes about 50% of total trade, the level of 
intra-ASEAN is very low because of the trade structure of the ASEAN 
member countries. For this reason preferential trade arrangements might 
be expected to have only a small feet on the direction of trade of the 
ASEAN member countries.
Intra-ASEAN trade is not evenly distributed among the member 
countries. Two major trade flows dominate: Singapore's trade with
Indonesia and Malaysia. These two flows accounted for 73% of all 
intra-ASEAN trade in 1981. Historically, Singapore served as a 
collecting and distribution centre of Indonesian and Malaysian goods to 
the other parts of the world. Because it is a city-state, Singapore 
also depends on the other member countries for foodstuffs and raw 
materials. For these reasons Singapore accounted for 54% of total 
imports and nearly 44% of total intra-ASEAN exports in 1981 (Figure 
4-3). The Philippines occupied the other end of the spectrum, 
contributing less than 5% to total intra-ASEAN imports and less than 4% 
to total intra-ASEAN exports.
Intra-ASEAN trade has been dominated by agricultural and other 
primary products (figure 4-4). These products constituted 73% of 
intra-ASEAN trade in 1981, with petroleum and oil products accounting 
for 34%. Manufactured goods only made up 25% of intra-ASEAN trade in 
1981. Tables 4-9 to 4-12 show the trade matrixes of imports and export 
of agricultural and manufactured products of the ASEAN member 
countries. Intra-ASEAN trade in primary products as a percentage of
ASEAN global trade in primary products was 26% compared to 12% for
manufactured products. The possibilities for increased trade in 
agricultural products are limited in part by the similarity of the 
agricultural environments, but in part also by the self-sufficiency 
agricultural policies followed by the ASEAN member country governments. 
Singapore's absorptive capacity for raw materials is necessarily 
limited. Trade in minerals is largely tied to economic growth. The
principal opportunities for intra-ASEAN trade are in intra-industry
trade following the EC's successful experience. It is here that tariff 
and non-tariff barriers seriously impede trade. Trade barriers are only 
low for those sophisticated capital goods for which the ASEAN member
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countries still for the most part lack productive capacity. The ASEAN 
member countries could develop the capacity to produce suitable goods 
for an ASEAN wide and world market, but this would require 
liberalization outside as well as within ASEAN to exploit economies of 
scale and competition, otherwise ASEAN would repeat the policy errors 
of such inward oriented regional integration arrangements as the ACM. 
Thus it is not surprising that although total value of intra-ASEAN 
trade has increased from year to year, total ASEAN trade has remained a 
constant proportion of trade with industrial countries.
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Table 4-7: Intra-ASEAN Trade,1981
($ million)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thai land
Indonesia 128 350 3420(a) 157
Malaysia 120 286 6683 578
Philippines 664 281 - 382 37
Singapore 3420 4175 239 - 1145
Thailand 181 590 53 1355 -
(a): The data of Singapore trade with Indonesia is derived from
Indonesia import from and export to Singapore.
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1981.
Table 4-8: Intra-ASEAN Trade as Share of Total ASEAN Trade, 1981
($ billion)
Total Total (2)
ASEAN Trade Intra-ASEAN Trade
(1) (2) (1)
Indonesia 35.3 4.4 12.4
Malaysia 23.2 5.2 22.3
Philippines 14.2 0.9 6.5
Singapore 48.5 11.8 24.4
Thailand 16.9 1.9 11.3
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1981
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Table 4-9: Intra-ASEAN Trade -Imports of Agricultural Products, 1981
($ million)
To
From Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Indonesia - 55 218 1745 22
Malaysia 30 - 158 2526 240
Philippines 263 22 - 37 11
Singapore 950 1037 42 - 606
Thailand 121 347 24 270 -
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1981
Table 4-10: Intra-ASEAN Trade -Exports of Agricultural Products, 1981
($ million)
From
To Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Indonesia - 32 136 950 112
Malaysia 37 - 12 1340 250
Philippines 403 147 - 101 12
Singapore 1745 2154 44 - 243
Thaj1 and 28 1718 7 568 _
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1981
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Table 4-11: Intra-ASEAN Trade - Imports of Manufactures, 1981
($ million)
To
From Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Indonesia - 13 13 215 2
Malaysia 29 - 9 851 27
Philippines 16 73 - 64 8
Singapore 290 432 52 - 66
Thailand 25 46 4 195 -
Source: UN iCommodity C Series Trade Data, 1981
Table 4-12: Intra-ASEAN Trade Exports of Manufactures, 1981 
(S million)
From
To Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Indonesia - 26 12 290 20
Malaysia 22 - 9 1836 56
Philippines 8 35 - 150 5
Singapore 215 480 25 - 214
Thai land 6 23 9 293 -
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data,1981
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CHAPTER 5
EFFECTS OF INTRA-ASEAN TARIFF REDUCTION ON THE ASEAN TRADE 
STRUCTURE IN MANUFACTURED GOODS
5.1 Overview of the Model
In the theory of demand for tradable goods, it is usually assumed 
that a given good supplied by sellers in one country is a perfect 
substitute for goods of the same kind supplied by any other country. 
This does not take into account differences in tariffs, subsidies and 
other forms of protection, other forms of government intervention, 
transport and insurance costs. Armington(1969) therefore developed a 
general theory of demand for products that are distinguished not only 
by their physical properties, but also by their place of production. In 
his theory, such products are distinguished from one another in the 
sense that they are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Starting with 
the general Hicksian model, Armington's approach runs through a 
sequence of progressively more restrictive assumptions leading to a 
specification of the product demand function which, though highly 
simplified, preserves the relationships among demand, income, and 
prices that are relevant for estimation and forecasting. Armington's 
approach, however, dealt entirely with demand. To account more 
specifically for the influence of government policies and to permit its 
use for market forecasting, the analysis presented in this chapter 
combines Armington's demand function with supply functions and 
government policy variables as suggested by Uehara and Tyers (1980) to 
examine the effects of tariff reductions on ASEAN trade in
manufactures.
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5.2 Model Description and Methodology Application1
The model is based empirically on a trade matrix (x —  ) consisting 
of the trade and production of the five individual ASEAN member 
countries and the rest of the world (ROW) as a sixth country group.
Following Armington's approach, the model is based on the theory of
separability in demand. In the model, manufactured goods are
distinguished by their location of production. That is, the geographic 
areas that serve as a basis for distinguishing products by origin are 
also used as a basis for identifying different sources of demand. Since 
there are six demand countries for manufactured goods and six supply
sources, the demand function contains 36 equations, of which 6 are 
domestic demand equations and 30 are import demand equations.
Since constant elasticities of demand and supply are assumed, the 
model is linear in proportional changes:
Value of imports by i from j:
A
National
Axii
X U
income in i:
A
y i Vi
Consumer price in i of imports from j:
Ai P. • ij i
Pij
Border price in i of imports from j
A
pij .LUpij
Domestic producers price in j:
j A
From Armington's theory, the proportional change in the demand in 
country i for manufactures produced in j is
^See Mathematical Appendix.
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A ~  Ai
xij = W i  + I eijk Pik k
Where t\^ is the income elasticity of demand in if and e—  ^ is the 
price elasticity of demand in i for goods produced in j with respect to 
the price of goods produced in k.
eijk ' {
-[(1 - sij) +sij.ei]
s ik [Oi - € X ]
j = k
j H K
(5.2)
Where o ^ is the elasticity of substitution in i, is the
corresponding price elasticity of demand and s . is the share of 
country j in total consumption in i.
The corresponding proportional change in production in country j 
is
A A <5 3 >
- <i pj
Where Cj is the medium-run elasticity of supply in j.
The market is closed in the model with the Walrasian equilibrium 
condition that there is no excess demand for the product of any 
country. Thus, the proportional change in the total global demand for 
the product of j must be equal to the proportional change in j's 
production:
(5.4)
T- e A
a su xu ~Aq*,- = 0
Where s^  is the share of destination 1 in the total output of j.
m 6The market shares, s. . and s. . are drawn from an initial tradei J iJ
matrix and can be assumed constant so long as the proportional changes 
introduced into the model are relatively small. Thus far, changes can 
be introduced primarily through the income variable, y^ . No price 
distortions have yet been introduced. These can be added in the form of 
domestic-to-border price ratios which summarize the variety of tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions affecting trade. On the import side, the 
nominal protection coefficient is assumed to be exogenous:
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i
(5.5)
Where g
ij
of country j 
changes, this
is the ratio of the consumer price in 
with the corresponding border price, 
becomes:
i of the product 
In proportional
A i A Am
" i j  ' " i j  + g i j
(5.6)
On the export side, the border distortions affecting exports and 
the infrastructural costs influencing delivery (border) prices in 
destination countries are summarised by
(5.7)
ge . Eli
ij P,-
Where g _  is the ratio of the delivery price in country i with the
producer price in j. This is also assumed 
proportional changes, this then becomes:
exogenous
"ij
/ e
Sij
(5.8)
Equations (5.1), (5.4), (5.6), and (5.8) constitute a 
self-contained system of equations equal in number to the set of 
endogenous price and quantity variables. In the model, all 6 trading 
countries are simultaneously producers, importers and exporters of 
manufactured goods. There are 36 unknowns of X-j, p* , and Pjj> anc* 6 
unknown producer prices, Pj. To solve for these, there are 36 equations 
of (5.1), 6 equations of (5.4), 36 equations of (5.6), and 36 equations 
of (5.8). All equations are linear in proportional changes, permitting 
solution by simple matrix inversion.
The left hand side of equation (5.1) is the proportional change of 
the demand in country i for manufactured goods as produced in country 
j. The first right hand side term signifies the effect of income growth 
in country i on the overall demand for manufactured goods. The second 
term gives the effect of the proportional change in the price of 
manufactured goods on the demand for imports to country i from country 
j (where k=j) . If k is not equal to j, the second term derives the 
contribution to the proportional change in import demand in country i
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for country j exports which is due to change in the prices at which the 
same commodity is imported from other countries, k (see mathematical 
appendix). The main assumptions of this demand function are as follows:
(1) Buyers' marginal rates of substitution between manufactured 
goods competing in a given market are independent of their purchases in 
other markets. Given this assumption, the manufactured goods demanded 
by each country (e.g., Indonesia's demand for manufactured 
goods-in-general) can be measured unambiguously. In Indonesia, 
manufactured goods supplied by different countries or groups of 
countries (including Indonesia itself) could be said to compete. 
Moreover, demand for manufactured goods (e.g., Indonesia's demand for 
Malaysian manufactured goods) can be rigorously expressed as a function 
of the size of the corresponding market (Indonesia's demand for 
manufactures-in-generaJ ) and of relative prices of the competing 
products (Armington, 1969A).
(2) The substitution elasticities among manufactured goods are 
constants: that is, they themselves do not depend on prices or market 
shares.
(3) The elasticity of substitution between the manufactures of any 
pair of countries competing in a given market is the same as that 
between the manufactures of any other pair of countries competing in 
that market. If both the elasticity of substitution in each market and 
the elasticity of demand for manufactures in general in each market are 
assumed to be the same everywhere, differences in the impact of the 
given price change on the trade of the different countries will result 
solely from the initial geographic pattern of trade. Armington (1969b) 
used this assumption to examine the role of trade structure. In this 
study, however, elasticities of demand and substitution are constant 
within countries but they differ between countries.
On the production side, each country produces a single homogeneous 
good for both domestic consumption and exports. Hence, equation (5.4) 
shows the effect of changes in producers' prices in country j on the 
import of manufactured goods of country 1 (i) and change in the size of 
all the countries in the import of manufactured goods from country j.
Government intervention which directly affects the level of 
producer and consumer prices in relation to international trading
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prices is taken into consideration in equations (5.6) and (5.8). This
m 6role is performed by a set of exogenous parameters (g_) anc* (gjj). 
These summarise the effects on prices of the tariff, subsidy and 
exchange rate policies of each consuming country i. g^., for example, 
is the nominal protection coefficient in country i with respect to 
goods produced in j. Differences in international and domestic 
transportation and insurance costs are also implicit in these 
parameters. Domestic consumer and producer prices are dependent on 
world prices and exogenous levels of government intervention (nominal 
protection coefficients) which are constant in all countries for which 
no policy change is explicitly implemented. All countries are "large" 
in that the impacts of their policies on world prices are measured.
The model is an exercise in medium term comparative statics. No 
attempt is made to measure the time pattern of trade response to price 
changes. Marginal cost curves are assumed to be upward-sloping in all 
countries. The model therefore does not permit experiments involving 
adjustment through specialization, economies of scale, learning by 
doing and the erosion of quasi rents of intra marginal firms through 
increased competitiveness, hence the model results may understate the 
benefits of ASEAN trade liberalization.
Applying this approach, the effects of discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory tariff cuts on trade creation and of trade diversion
in ASEAN manufactured goods were examined. Three different trade
liberalization policies were considered: (1) extending the present
partial preferential arrangements to a 20% across-the-board tariff
reduction on manufactured goods within ASEAN member countries, while
keeping the tariffs of the ASEAN member countries against the ROW
country group unchanged; (2) complete intra-ASEAN trade liberalization
while keeping the tariffs of the ASEAN member countries against the ROW
ocountry group unchanged; and (3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization .
2An experiment to gauge the effects of unilateral trade 
liberalization by all five ASEAN member countries was also carried out, 
but as expected, did not lead to favorable results for production or 
trade because of the short term nature of the model. Unilateral 
liberalization vis a vis the rest of the world will only lead to trade 
growth if the liberalizing economies are flexible and the model 
framework precludes flexibility. It does not represent reality 
sufficiently closely to be a useful tool of analysis, but it has been 
included for the sake of completion in Appendix C.
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Two different types of experiment were carried out. Firstly, each
trade liberalization policy was adopted by the trading partners on the
basis of present protection levels. This set of experiments was done
with substitution elasticities equal to 1 and 2. All these experiments
were completed using single-step solutions of the model- assuming the 
m 0shares s. . and s. . remain constant. Where the changes of policy ij iJ
resulted in large proportional changes in trade flows, this assumption 
is voliated and accurate results can only be derived from a succession 
of solutions, subdividing the policy changes into a series of small 
steps. When this procedure was carried out, however, the results were 
not significantly different from those derived from single-step 
solutions.
5.3 Data and Model limitations
The principal manufactured trade matrix (X —  ) is derived from UN C 
series trade data and based on import data for the year 1981. 
Manufactured goods have been aggregated from the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) 3 digit to the 1 digit level and covered 
from section 5 to 8 minus 6.8 (Table 5-1). The data used in the model 
has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the intra-ASEAN trade statistics 
are not complete , especially for trade between Indonesia and 
Singapore. Singapore does not publish any statistics on trade with 
Indonesia. The data for Indonesia's official exports to Singapore have 
therefore been used as the data of the Singapore's imports from 
Indonesia. This probably underestimates the flow.
Secondly, there is a significant discrepancy between exports and 
imports of Singapore and the corresponding imports and exports of its 
trading partners. These discrepancies are due to the double counting 
of entrepot trade. For example, when Malaysia imports goods from Japan 
through the port of Singapore, Malaysia considers it as an import from 
Japan but Singapore also considers it as an import from Japan and an 
export to Malaysia. For extra-ASEAN trade such double counting leads to 
an overstatement of imports from Japan and to a discrepancy between the 
figures for Singapore's imports and exports. As already noted, 
Singapore's entrepot trade could not be excluded, and Singapore's data 
has to be treated with great cautions.
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Thirdly, the internal trade data of the five ASEAN member 
countries, are calculated from the gross value of GDP originating in 
manufacturing and estimates of various relations between gross value 
and net value added in manufacturing for each ASEAN member country. The 
estimation of the internal trade for the country group, ROW, is 
regarded as a residual since origin and destination are irrelevant for 
this exercise.
Table 5-1: Manufactured Products Trade Matrix for the ASEAN Member
Countries,1981
($ million)
Imports
of
Indo­
nesia
Maiay- 
sia
Philip­
pines
Sin­
gapore
Thai­
land ROW.
Total
sales
Total
export
From: 
Indo­
nesia
39133 14 13 505 2 139 39806 673
Malay­
sia
30 9071 9 850 27 1383 11370 2299
Philip­
pines
16 73 46605 65 8 1167 47934 1329
Singa­
pore
290 432 52 6985 66 9260 17085 10100
Thai­
land
25 46 4 195 12107 1478 13855 1748
ROW. 8608 6803 3724 12793 5339 4000000 4037267 37267
Total
purchase 48102 16439 50407 21393 17549 4013427 4167317
Total
import 8969 7368 3802 14408 5442 13427 53416
Note: Total manufactured trade = 4167317.
Total external trade for manufactures = 53416. 
Source: UN Commodity C Series Trade Data, 1981
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Fourthly, the model has five important sets of parameters: income 
elasticities of demand, elasticities of substitution, price 
elasticities of demand, price elasticities of supply and nominal 
protection rates of manufactured goods (Table 5-2). The elasticities 
are parameters that measure the strength of a presumed cause-effect 
relationship between relative prices and relative quantities demanded. 
They can be estimated econometrica1ly. However, in this study, the 
substitution elasticity data for the five ASEAN member countries are 
based on previous empirical research (mainly Lim) The simple average of 
the substitution elasticity of all the manufactured goods which have 
been estimated is 1.75. Since the total value of the manufactured goods 
for which the elasticity of substitution was estimated was over 50% of 
all manufactured goods, the average substitution elasticity of 
manufactured goods for the ASEAN member countries is highly likely to 
be between 1 and 3. The nominal protection rates of manufactured goods 
of the five member countries are based on Bautista (1981). The other 
three sets of parameters are rough rule of thumb estimates. All five
Osets of parameters are behavioral hypotheses. Sensitivity analysis was 
conducted to examine how the outcomes of the experiments vary as the 
values of the parameters are altered, mainly as the elasticity of 
substitution varies between 1 and 3.
5.4 Model Results
Tables 5-3 to 5-7 provide a picture of the trade effects of the 
various liberalization options with the estimation of substitution 
elasticities equal to 2.
(1) With a 20% tariff reduction, trade creation effects occur, but 
they are very small. Each ASEAN member country has an increase in total 
imports and exports of manufactured goods (Table 5-3). The export 
growth rates are higher than those of imports in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand. Theoretically, domestic production should increase to 
take advantage of the trade diversion and creation possibilities.
O Only one of the parameters, that is elasticity of substitution, is 
subject to sensitivity analysis.
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Table 5-2: Selected Parameter Values
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
IED 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.90 1.00
PED -1.00 -0.80 -1.00 -0.70 -0.90 -0.90
SE 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
PES 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.80 0.80
NPR 1.34 1.16 1.46 1.10 1.29 1.20
Note:
IED = income elasticity,
PED = price elasticity of demand,
SE = substitution elasticity,
PES = price elasticity of supply,
NPR = simple average of nominal protection rate of manufactured goods. 
Source: As indicated in text.
Except in Indonesia, this was the case in the model. However, the 
amount consumed of own production in each country should decrease, and 
this was, albeit on a very small scale, also the case in the model
(Table 5-4). The compensation for decrease in internal trade mainly
comes from the other ASEAN member countries; that is, supplies switch 
from higher cost domestic producers to lower cost producers in the 
other member countries; The effect of the 20% tariff reduction on the 
rest of the world is very small. As Table 5-4 shows, all the ASEAN
member countries increase their imports from ROW, but, the percentage 
increases are all less than 0.01% . Since the Philippines had a higher 
protection rate previously, the other member countries enjoy the
highest (0.12%) increase in exports to the Philippines (compared with 
0.1% for Indonesia, 0.09% for Thailand, 0.05% for Malaysia). Singapore, 
as the most open economy, only has 0.04% increase in its imports from 
each of the other member countries. The total gains from the tariff 
reductions of the individual ASEAN member country depend both on their 
shares in ASEAN markets and on the share of the domestically produced 
manufactured goods in each country's market. With the most advanced 
technology and the largest share in intra-ASEAN trade, Singapore would
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be the major beneficiary from the 20% tariff reduction. The value of 
regional trade would increase from $2.7 billion to $2.9 billion, or by 
5.1% (Table 5-7) .
(2) If all intra-ASEAN trade barriers were eliminated (Table 5-4), 
trade creation effects would be higher than those of a 20% tariff 
reduction, but the trade increase is still very small. With free 
intra-ASEAN trade, all the ASEAN member countries would have a higher 
level of total imports and exports than in the 20% tariff reduction 
case (Table 5-3). The consumption of domestically produced manufactured 
goods again only rises in the Philippines (Table 5-4). All the ASEAN 
member countries increase their exports. The trade creation effects are 
higher than with the 20% tariff reduction for all the ASEAN member 
countries as well as for rest of the world; the total value of regional 
trade increases from $2.7 billion to $3.4 billion, or by 25.5% (Table 
5-7). Note that there is no difference in the increase of intra-ASEAN 
trade between the ASEAN liberalization and world liberalization. While 
this suggests that (with an SE=2) intra-ASEAN has limits equivalent to 
a 25% increase in present trade. The ASEAN and world liberalization 
cases will have different qualitative outcomes. In the ASEAN 
liberalization case, there would be trade creation and trade dibersion. 
In the global liberalization case different goods would be traded and 
the 25% increase in ASEAN trade would consist of trade creation. A 
similar result is allowed with SE=3. ASEAN liberalization led to a 39% 
increase and global liberization to 40.4% increase(Table B-10).
(3) Trade creation effects are the highest with world trade 
liberalization, both for the individual ASEAN member countries and also 
for the rest of the world. Singapore's imports decrease slightly (Table 
5-3). A greater volume of exports could lead to greater competitiveness 
for Singapore in its home markets4 .
(4) If ASEAN member countries liberalize unilaterally, (Tables 5-5 
and 5-6), the country which adopts the liberalization policy increases 
total imports from the other member countries but it also increases its 
exports. The percentage change in the exports of the other member
4As the model does not provide for economies of scale, learning by 
doing etc, this is a puzzling result in terms of the model.
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countries reflect the importance of the trading partners in the market 
of that particular country (Tables 5-8 and 5-9). Thus trade 
liberalization by Singapore has a major effects on imports from 
Indonesia and Malaysia which are major trading partners. In the case of 
Singapore's unilateral liberalization, total imports increase greatly 
to that country, and the other ASEAN member countries reduce their 
total imports.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Appendix B indicates the trade effects of the various 
liberalization policies with different estimates of substitution 
elasticities. With 20% tariff reduction and SE=1, all the ASEAN member 
countries increase their total imports and exports of manufactured 
goods (Table B-l). The export growth rates are higher than those of the 
imports in all the countries. The consumption of domestically produced 
manufactured goods (internal trade) decreases. The Philippines is the 
only exception (Table B-2). A possible explanation is that as the 
Philippines is the most protectionist country before the tariff 
reduction, domestic producers are still protected with a 20% tariff 
reduction and hence, the share of production consumed domestically, 
remains unchanged. Alternatively, SE=1 is too low for the Philippines. 
Compensation for the decrease in the consumption of domestically 
produced goods comes mainly from the other member countries. Since the 
Philippines had higher protection rates previously, the other member 
countries benefit from the highest (6%) increase in exports to the 
Philippines (compared to 5% for Indonesia and Thailand, 3% for 
Malaysia, and only 2% for Singapore). The effect of the 20% tariffs 
reduction on the rest of the world is again very small. Trade diversion 
only occurs in Indonesia and it is less than 0.01%. The value of 
regional trade increases from $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion or by 2.6% 
(Table B-5).
With free intra-ASEAN trade, all the ASEAN member countries have a 
higher level of total imports and exports than in the 20% tariff 
reduction case. The higher cost of domestically produced manufactured 
goods decrease in all the ASEAN member countries, again, the 
Philippines is an exception and the offset is distributed among the
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other ASEAN member countries according to the percentages shown in the 
Table B-2. Again, trade diversion effects occur in Indonesia; however, 
the effect is still less than 0.01%. Total regional trade increases 
from $2.7 billion to $3.1 billion or by 13%. (Table B-5). The trade 
diversion effect on the rest of the world is again very small, less 
than 0.01% (Table B-2).
In the 'first best' case, that is, world wide trade 
liberalization, not only do the individual ASEAN member countries 
attain the highest level of imports and exports, but so does the rest 
of the world. Trade effects of the various liberalization policies have 
a close relationship to the elasticities of substitution. When SE=1 and 
SE=2, all the ASEAN member countries have a lower percentage increase 
in total imports and exports with the 20% tariffs reduction than when 
SE=3. However, trade diversion occurs in Malaysia and Singapore in the 
case of world liberalization(Table B-7). Trade creation occurs in both 
20% tariff reduction in ASEAN and ASEAN liberalization with the latter 
has a higher percentage than the former. Percentage changes in total 
intra-ASEAN trade are affected by the various trade liberalization 
policies. With 20% tariff reduction, the total value of intra-ASEAN 
trade increases by 7.5%; with intra-ASEAN trade liberalization, it 
increases by 39% and with world trade liberalization by 40.4% (Table 
B-10).
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Table 5-3: Trade Effects of Various Trade Liberalization
Policies on Percentage Changes of Imports and Exports,
SE = 2
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff reduction in ASEAN
Imports 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 -0.0
Exports 3.1 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4
Product. - 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization
Imports 3.4 4.0 3.6 1.7 3.1 -0.0
Exports 15.3 7.3 3.5 3.1 -8.2 1.8
Product. -0.5 1.3 0.1 1.6 0.4 0.7
(3) ASEAN and World trade liberalization
Import 28.0 6.3 40.7 -2.9 22.6 18.3
Export 22.1 22.6 31.2 16.0 25.9 12.5
Product. -0 .4 4.4 0.8 9.3 3.2 -12.0
Note: Product.= total production
Table 5-4: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies on
the Individual ASEAN Member Country, SE = 2
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff reduction in ASEAN
Indonesia -0.00 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.00
Malaysia 0.10 -0.00 0.12 0.03 0.09 -0.00
Philippines 0.10 0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00
Singapore 0.10 0.05 0.12 -0.00 0.09 -0.00
ThaiI and 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.04 -0.00 0.00
ROW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization
Indonesia -0.01 0.28 0.63 0.18 0.45 0.00
Malaysia 0.50 -0.00 0.63 0.16 0.45 -0.00
Philippines 0.50 0.28 -0.00 0.18 0.45 0.00
Singapore 0.50 0.26 0.62 -0.00 0.44 -0.00
Thailand 0.50 0.27 0.63 0.18 -0.00 0.00
ROW 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
(3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization
Indonesia -0.01 0.28 0.63 0.18 0.45 0.33
Malaysia 0.50 -0.00 0.63 0.16 0.45 0.26
Phi 1ippines 0.50 0.28 -0.00 0.18 0.45 0.32
Singapore 0.50 0.26 0.62 -0.01 0.44 0.14
Thailand 0.50 0.28 0.63 0.18 -0.00 0.26
ROW 0.27 0.05 0.40 -0.05 0.22 -0.12
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Table 5-5: Trade Effects of Intra-ASEAN Liberalization by Each
Member Country, on the Percentage Change of Imports and
Exports, SE = 2
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) Indonesia f ree intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Exports 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 -0.2
Product. -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0
(2) Malaysia free .intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.4 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.1
Exports 0.6 0.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.4
Product. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2
(3) Philippines free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exports 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0
Product. 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
(4) Singapore f ree intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.8 0.2
Exports 13.1 5.5 0.9 0.3 1.9 1.5
Product. 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5
(5) Thailand f ree intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 -0.0
Exports 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Product. -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Note: Product.= total production
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Table 5-6: Trade Effects of ASEAN and World Liberalization by
Individual ASEAN Member Countries, on the Percentage Change 
of Imports and Exports, SE = 2
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) Indonesia free world trade
Imports 41.6 -7.5 -8.0 -7.1 -8.0 -0.0
Exports 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 3.3
Product. -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 -2.3
(2) Malaysia free world trade
Imports -9.5 17.9 -9.7 -8.7 -9.7 -0.1
Exports 0.6 0.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 -4.9
Product. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 -2.8
(3) Philippines free world trade
Imports -4.0 -3.9 58.7 -3.7 -4.1 0.0
Exports 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 2.1
Product. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -1.2
(4) Singapore free world trade
Imports -7.5 -7.3 -7.8 9.9 -7.8 0.2
Exports 13.1 5.5 0.9 0.3 1.9 -2.1
Product. 0.2 1.0 0.0 0 .2 0 .2 -2.3
(5) Thailand free world trade
Imports -11.7 -11.3 -12.0 -10.8 32.7 -0.0
Exports 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 -5.8
Product. 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.1 -3.5
Note: Product.= total production
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Table 5-7: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies on
Intra-ASEAN Trade, SE = 2
Pol icy
Percentage Change 
of
Intra-ASEAN Trade
All ASEAN member countries:
(1) 20% tariff reduction 5.1
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization 25.5
(3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization 25.5
Individual ASEAN member countries:
Indonesia (2) 6.6
(3) 6.6
Malaysia (2) 5.5
(3) 5.5
Philippines (2) 1.8
(3) 1.8
Singapore (2) 10.0
(3) 10.0
Thailand (2) 1.7
(3) 1.7
Note :
(2) = intra-ASEAN trade liberalization,
(3) = ASEAN and world trade liberalization.
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Table 5-8: Import Shares of Each Trade Partner,1981
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
Indonesia 0.8135 0.0009 0.0003 0.0236 0.0001 0.0000
Malaysia 0.0006 0.5518 0.0002 0.0397 0.0015 0.0003
Philippines 0.0003 0.0044 0.9246 0.0030 0.0005 0.0003
Singapore 0.0060 0.0263 0.0010 0.3265 0.0038 0.0023
ThaiJ and 0.0005 0.0028 0.0001 0.0091 0.6899 0.0004
ROW 0.1790 0.4138 0.0739 0.5980 0.3042 0.9967
Soure: Derived from basic trade matrix, 
Table 5-9: Export Shares of
1981
Each Trade Partner,1981
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
Indonesia 0.9831 0.0004 0.0003 0.0127 0.0001 0.0035
Malaysia 0.0026 0.7978 0.0008 0.0748 0.0024 0.1216
Philippines 0.0003 0.0015 0.9723 0.0014 0.0002 0.0243
Singapore 0.0170 0.0253 0.0030 0.4088 0.0039 0.5420
Thailand 0.0018 0.0033 0.0003 0.0141 0.8738 0.1067
ROW 0.0021 0.0017 0.0009 0.0032 0.0013 0.9908
Source: Derived from the basic trade matrix,1981.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
Since the formation of ASEAN, the five member countries have 
continued to experience rapid economic growth. The economic structure 
of the ASEAN member countries and their patterns of trade have changed 
greatly. However, this successful economic performance owed little to 
regional integration. The strength of the ASEAN economies can be traced 
back to several interacting factors. Among those factors, government 
policy is the most important. Although government policies vary from 
country to country, they have the following similarities:
All the ASEAN member countries had export-oriented development 
strategies. Participating in world trade led to relatively efficient 
resource allocation, the exploitation of specialization and economies 
of scale and of other sources of efficiency in exporting industries. 
Monetary policies focused on price stability, which together with 
growing exports generally enabled realistic exchange rates to be 
maintained without damaging devaluations except in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Fiscal policies generally supported stability and 
investment in productive infrastructure. The ASEAN member countries 
hence had less distorted economies and better resource allocation and 
utilization than most developing countries. Basically sound policies 
were also reflected in high domestic saving rates and levels of capital 
inflows that enabled high investment rates to be sustained without the 
creation of intolerable debt burdens (except in the Philippines). 
Agricultural production grew rapidly (except in the Philippines) since 
the 1960's and particularly in the 1970s, enabling industrialization to 
take off from a sound base. Poverty alleviation through agricultural 
progress and employment creation in secondary and tertiary industries 
was relative successful in all but the Philippines.
Political and security rather than economic considerations were 
the main reason for the formation of ASEAN in 1967. The ASEAN member
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countries at that time differed widely in many respects. Fully aware of 
these diversities, the ASEAN leaders took a cautious approach to 
regional cooperation and integration. An insistence on consensus and a 
flexible, open-ended approach to problems contributed greatly to 'ASEAN 
solidarity'.
Although ASEAN has existed since 1967, a serious attempt at 
economic integration was only initiated at the Bali summit in 1976. The 
most important areas of ASEAN integration were considered then to lie 
in investment in multinational industrial projects, complementation and 
joint venture private enterprise agreements, all supported by trade 
preferences, and in trade liberalization. But progress in industrial 
cooperation, predictably on the basis of theory and experience in other 
developing country integration areas, appears to have been negligible. 
The establishment of a Preferential Trade Agreement in intra-regional 
trade similarly had very limited effects.
The principal products mutually traded by the ASEAN member 
countries were complementary agricultural products and raw materials. 
These were generally subject to low trade barriers. Trade could expand 
without integration arrangements. Gains could have been made in 
intra-industry trade, but here a rea] reduction of barriers was 
impossible because of highly protectionist attitudes in the Philippines 
and Indonesia. Trade in manufactures has therefore remained heavily 
turned towards industrial countries, over 50% of total exports, but 
more than that percentage of exports of manufactures being with Japan, 
the United State and the EC. The goods imported from these three major 
trading partners largely consist of manufactured goods, while 
agricultural and mineral raw materials form the bulk of ASEAN exports 
to industrial countries.
Given the diversity of the ASEAN member countries' development 
levels and of their major domestic interest groups, experience in other 
integration areas suggests that prospects for expanding intra-regional 
trade by trade liberalization in manufacturing products are limited. 
The simulation results confirm the hypothesis that the effects of 
liberalization of trade in manufactured goods within ASEAN trade would 
be negligible for a 20% preferential arrangement and low even for free 
intra-ASEAN trade in terms of trade creation and hence of production
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and welfare. Liberalization would, however, have much greater effects 
if it were part of a world wide trade liberalization. Hence, the 
important achievement of ASEAN in the economic field has been in the 
coordination of important economic negotiations with trading partners, 
rather than in economic cooperation within the region.
ASEAN policies should thus continue to be outward looking rather 
than leading to trade diversion. The prospects for regional integration
are limited although there is continuing scope f or the economic
cooperation that has already made a contribution to the favorable
environment that has fostered economic growth in ASEAN member
countries. ASEAN should not take a confrontational stance against the 
rest of the world: other regional organizations have found such 
postures self defeating. On the contrary, the ASEAN member countries 
individually and as a group should continue to benefit from and 
contribute to global trade, capital and labour flows.
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A. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Derivation of the demand function for manufactured goods is based 
on the assumptions of imperfect substitution and constant-elasticity- 
of-substitution (C.E.S. Utility Function). With the assumption of 
separability in demand, the utility function has the general form
U = U(xn .x12. ’x lm’x23 *
(1 )
• ' ' ' x2m......... xn l ..........xn m )
Where x —  is country i demand for manufactured goods produced by 
country j. If has price p —  , and if y^ is total expenditure of
country i on manufactured goods, the consumer's problem is then to 
maximize:
u = u(xn ...... xiJ
Subject to:
2  Pijx ij = y i (2)
j
If the utility to be derived from the consumption of manufactured 
goods is specified according to a CES function, the consumer's problem 
for manufactured goods becomes:
Maximize:
L'c(xil......... x im>
\i *71'1 i
Subject to
(3)
(4)
4  PijXij ‘ yi
J
With the assumption of CES for the equation (A.3), Armington
derives the specific demand function:
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x. • = b°i X i (-JJ) a i (5)
ij Pi
Where a ■ = ------J 1 + Pi
is the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods competing 
in the market of country i. Equation (A.5) also can be written in 
proportional form:
- U  = b°i ( - U  )~°i (6) 
x i ij pi
With some further manipulation, Armington obtains the following 
expression for percentage changes in country i's demand for 
manufactured goods produced by country j :
dxij „ dVi
xij yi
dpi i- [(1 - Sij) Oi + Sij €i]
2. sik(°i - €i>
k=j
dpl
+ Z  ei/l —
ik
'ik
l = i
(7)
The bracketed coefficient of the second term is the direct,
partial elasticity of demand for x^j, and the bracketed coefficient of 
the third term is the cross elasticity of demand for x —  with respect 
to the price of any other manufactured goods competing in country i's 
market. Hence, the growth of demand for x^j is divided into the
following components: an income effect (first term), an "own price"
effect (second term), the effect of prices of closely-related products 
(third term), and the effect of all other prices (fourth term). In 
order to focus attention on how changes in individual prices affect 
trade, a further simplifying assumption has been considered, It is that 
the fourth term of equation (A.7) is small enough to be ignored.
Equation (A.7) can be written:
A
^iYi
k
e ijk (8 )
ij
Axi i
x ij
Where
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A Ay j
A
P ij
e ijk “ £(1 sij>°i + s ij€l]
e ijk = S ik<a i - €i>
j = k
j * k
To take into consideration the effect of government intervention, 
the consumer's price in country i is distorted according to:
Pi
ij
m
g. .Pij‘ij (9)
Differentiating equation (A.9) 
to the following proportional change
and dividing through by 
form:
leads
ij
Am
+ g i j
The producer's price in country i has the form:
(10)
Pij ’ijPJ ( 1 1 )
Again the expression can be differentiated, leading after division 
by Pjj to:
A e
g ( 1 2 )
If we specify the total quantity of manufactured goods produced, 
and thereby available for export, as a function of producer's prices, 
we have a self-contained system of equations equal in number to the 
number of endogenous price and quantity variables. The supply function 
takes the following form:
2  xij - a/ Cj (13)1 J
Wjth some further manipulation equation (A.13) can be expressed in
the proportional change form:
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^  SljXlj
A
qj (14)
Where
And
lj JJZ  xij
qj = cjpj
Combining equations (A.8), (A.10), (A.12) and (A.14) we obtain an
(15)
expression with x.- • as the only endogenous variable:
(fiü 8e. _ D £ + fill y s?. £
ij
i j r z.- 1 i 1 jCj l^i J
T  -Alls T  se x^  c jL, sik xlkk*j ck 7
-Kij
Where K —  introduces exogenous disturbances to the market due to 
income or policy changes.
.. A  y  ,Ae Am .Kij - " Z, eijk <*ik + sik)k
Equation A. 15 can be written in matrix form of we define a grand 
vector of trade flows X, and a corresponding vector K.
X = (xn ,x12, . . . a  ,-xnn>
(16)
Ü - *"K11'“K12’ • • (17)
Then (18)
AX = K
: solution is obtained by inverting the matrix A:
X = A !K (19)
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B. DATA APPENDIX
Table 1: Trade Effects of Various Trade Liberalization
Policies on Percentage Changes of Imports and Exports,
SE = 1
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff reduction in ASEAN
Imports 0.2 0.2 0 .2 0.2 0.1 -0.0
Exports 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.0
Product. -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.0
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization
Imports 0.8 1 . 1 0.7 1.0 0.5 -0.0
Exports 7.6 3.9 1.7 1.5 1.8 -0.0
Product. -0.2 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.0
(3) ASEAN and World trade liberalization
Imports 23.7 12.4 30.1 7.8 21.1 11.5
Exports 11.0 12.6 15.9 10.6 14.2 16.3
Product. -0.1 2 .5 0.5 6.2 1.8 -1.0
Note: Product.= total production
77
Table 2: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies on
Individual ASEAN Member Countries, SE=1
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff reduction in ASEAN
Indonesia -0.00 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.00
Malaysia 0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.00
Philippines 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00
Singapore 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.00 0.05 -0.00
Thailand 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.00 -0.00
ROW -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization
Indonesia -0.00 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.22 0.00
Malaysia 0.25 -0.00 0.31 0.08 0.22 -0.00
Philippines 0.25 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.00
Singapore 0.25 0.13 0.31 -0.00 0.22 -0.00
Thailand 0.25 0.14 0.31 0.09 -0.00 -0.00
ROW -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization
Indonesia -0.00 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.22 0.17
Malaysia 0.25 -0.00 0.31 0.08 0.22 0.14
Philippines 0.25 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.16
Singapore 0.25 0.13 0.31 -0.00 0.22 0.10
Thai1 and 0.25 0.14 0.31 0.09 -0.00 0.15
ROW 0.24 0.12 0.30 0.08 0.21 -0.01
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Ta b l e  3: Trade  E f f e c t s  of  Intra-ASEAN L i b e r a l i z a t i o n  of  Each
Member Count ry  on t h e  P e r c e n t a g e  Change of  I mpor t s  and
E x p o r t s ,  SE = 1
I n d o n e s i a  Ma l a ys i a  P h i l i p p i n e s S i n g a p o r e Tha H a n d ROW
(1) I n d o n e s i a f r e e intra-ASEAN t r a d e
Impor t s 0 . 7 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 - 0 . 0
Ex p o r t s 0 . 0 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 7 0 . 3 - 0 . 0
P r o d u c t . - 0 . 3 0.1 0 . 0 0 . 4 0 . 1 - 0 . 0
(2) Ma l a ys i a f r e e  :intra-ASEAN t r a d e
Impor t s 0 . 0 1.0 0 . 0 - 0 . 0 0 . 0 - 0 . 0
E x p o r t s 0 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 8 0 . 0 0 . 3 - 0 . 0
P r o d u c t . - 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 3 0 . 1 - 0 . 0
(3) P h i l i p p i n e s  f r e e  int ra-ASEAN t r a d e
Impor t s 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 1 - 0 . 0 0 . 0 - 0 . 0
E xpor t s 0 . 6 0.1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0.1 - 0 . 0
P r o d u c t . 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.1 0 . 0 - 0 . 0
(4) S i n g a p o r e f r e e intra-ASEAN t r a d e
I mpor t s 0 . 1 0.1 0 . 1 1.0 0.1 0 . 0
Ex p o r t s 6 . 7 3 . 0 1.0 0.1 1.0 0 . 0
P r o d u c t . 0 . 1 0 . 6 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 0
(5) T h a i l a n d f r ee intra-ASEAN t r a d e
Impor t s 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 - 0 . 0 0 . 4 - 0 . 0
E xpor t s 0 . 0 0 . 3 0 . 2 0.1 0 . 0 0 . 0
P r o d u c t . - 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 0 - 0 . 0
Note:  P r o d u c t . = t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n
Table 4: Trade Effects of ASEAN and World Liberalization
of Individual ASEAN Member Countries, on the Percentage 
Change of Imports and Exports, SE = 1
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) Indonesia free world trade
Imports 24.6 0.4 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.0
Exports 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 5.3
Product. -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 -0.1
(2) Malaysia free world trade
Imports -0.6 13.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.0
Exports 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.9
Product. -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.2
(3) Pilippines free world trade
Imports -0.2 -0.2 31.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0
Exports 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.9
Product. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
(4) Singapore free world trade
Imports -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 8.5 -0.5 0.0
Exports 6.7 3.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 2.6
Product. 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0 .2 -0.2
(5) Thailand free world trade
Imports -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 21.7 0.0
Exports 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Product. -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3
Note: Product.= total production
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Table 5: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies on
Intra-ASEAN Trade, SE = 1
Pol icy
Percentage Change 
of
Intra-ASEAN Trade
All ASEAN member countries:
(1) 20% tariff reduction 2.6
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization 13.0
(3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization 13.0
Individual ASEAN member countries:
Indonesia (2) 3.3
(3) 3.3
Mai ays is (2) 2.8
(3) 2.8
Philippines (2) 0.9
(3) 0.9
Singapore (2) 5.1
(3) 5.1
Thailand (2) 0.8
(3) 0.8
Note:
(2) = intra-ASEAN trade liberalization,
(3) = ASEAN and world trade liberalization.
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Table 6: Trade Effects of Various Liberalization Policies on
the Percentage Change of Imports and Exports, SE = 3
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff 
Imports
reduction in ASEAN 
2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.1 0.0
Exports 4.6 2.1 1.1 1.0 1 .1 1.6
Product. -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.4
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade 
Imports 11.1
liberalization 
11.7 12.1 9.4 11.1 0.2
Exports 1.0 5.2 0.9 6.1 3.4 2.1
Product. -1.0 2.1 0.1 2.9 0.6 2.2
(3) World trade liberalization 
Imports 13.8 -16.7 33.7 -30.4 5.8 23.8
Exports 33.7 31.4 46.8 22.2 36.6 -11.4
Product. -1.4 6.8 1.3 13.0 4.9 -23.8
Notes: (I) The three different liberalization policies are carried on 
progressively in simultaneous experiments.
(2) Product.= total production
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Table 7: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies on
Individual ASEAN Member Countries, SE=3
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) 20% tariff 
Indonesia
reduction in ASEAN 
-0.00 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.00
Malaysia 0.15 -0.00 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.00
Philippines 0.15 0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.14 0.00
Singapore 0.15 0.07 0.18 -0.00 0.14 0.00
Thailand 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.05 -0.00 0.00
ROW 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade 
Indonesia -0.01
liberalization 
0.42 0.95 0.27 0.68 0.01
Malaysia 0.74 -0.00 0.95 0.22 0.67 0.00
Philippines 0.75 0.42 -0.00 0.28 0.68 0.01
Singapore 0.74 0.38 0.93 -0.01 0.67 0.00
Thailand 0.74 0.41 0.95 0.27 -0.00 0.00
ROW 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.02
(3) ASEAN and 
Indonesia
world trade liberalization 
-0.02 0.43 0.96 0.27 0.69 0.51
Malaysia 0.73 -0.00 0.94 0.22 0.67 0.35
Philippines 0.74 0.44 -0.00 0.29 0.69 0.48
Singapore 0.72 0.37 0.91 -0.01 0.65 0.17
Thailand 0.73 0.42 0.95 0.27 -0.00 0.36
ROW 0.09 -0.23 0.31 -0.39 0.04 -0.23
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Table 8: Trade Effects of Intra-ASEAN Liberalization by Each
Member Country, on the Percentage Change of Imports and
Exports, SE = 3
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore; ThailandI ROW
(1) Indonesia free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.1
Exports 1.2 1. 1 1.0 2.3 1.2 -0.3
Product. -1.2 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1
(2) Malaysia free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 1.9 4.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 -0.0
Exports 0.4 1.8 0.1 1.1 0.6 0.4
Product. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
(3) Philippines free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.2 0.2 2.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Exports 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Product. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
(4) Singapore free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 7.2 6.6 6.9 6.2 6.9 0.3
Exports 1 .2 2.8 0.5 4.2 2.2 1.3
Product. 0 .2 1.4 0 .0 0.0 0 .4 1.4
(5) Thailand free intra-ASEAN trade
Imports 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.7 0.0
Exports 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.1
Product. -0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Notes: (1) Free intra-ASEAN trade policy is suggested as the first step 
of trade liberalization of each ASEAN member countries.
(2) Product.= total production
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Table 9: Trade Effects of ASEAN and World Liberalization by
Individual ASEAN Member Countries, on the Percentage Change 
of Imports and Exports, SE=3
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) Indonesia free world trade
Imports 52.4 -19.1 -20.3 -18.1 -20.2 -0.2
Exports 2.3 1.8 1.6 3.7 1.9 -4.5
Product. -2.1 0.4 0.0 27.4 0.2 -4.3
(2) Malaysia free world trade
Imports -23.0 18.1 -23.5 -21.0 -23.5 -0.1
Exports 1 .2 1.4 3.2 1.9 1.4 -16.7
Product. 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 -5.2
(3) Philippines free world trade
Imports -10.1 -9.8 83.7 -9.3 -10.4 0.1
Exports 3.9 0.8 2.4 1.0 0.5 -1.2
Product. 0.1 0 .2 0.1 0.6 0.1 -2.3
(4) Singapore free world trade
Imports -16.1 -15.7 -16.9 8.6 -16.8 0.4
Exports 20.0 8.3 1.6 0.8 3.5 -9.2
Product. 0 .3 1.6 0.0 0.5 0 .4 -3.9
(5) Thailand free world trade
Imports -29.8 -28.6 -30.3 -27.3 36.6 - 0.1
Exports 0.3 1.3 0.6 0.6 1 . 1 -21.4
Product. 0 .1 0 .2 0.0 0.3 0.1 -6.7
Notes: (1) Free world trade policy is suggested as the second step of 
the trade liberalization in ASEAN member countries.
(2) Product.= total production
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Table 10: The Effects of Various Trade Liberalization Policies
on Intra-ASEAN Trade, SE=3
Percentage Change
Policy of
Intra-ASEAN Trade
All ASEAN member countries:
(1) 20% tariff reduction 7.5
(2) Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization 39.0
(3) ASEAN and world trade liberalization 40.4
Individual ASEAN member countries:
Indonesia (2) 11.0
(3) 16.4
Malaysia (2) 8.7
(3) 10.6
Philippines (2) 3.0
(3) 6.2
Singapore (2) 14.7
(3) 15.5
Thailand (2) 2.3
(3) 4.6
Notes:
(2) = intra-ASEAN trade liberalization,
(3) = ASEAN and world trade liberalization.
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C. UNSUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT
Table 1: The Effects of Unilateral Trade Liberalization
of the ASEAN Member Countries, SE=2
(percent)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ROW
(1) percentage change of total imports and exports
Imports 8.9 -12.0 21.2 -20.5 3.1 -0.0
Exports 15.3 7.3 3.5 3.1 3.7 -7.4
Product. -0.5 1.3 0.1 1.6 0.4 -12.2
(2) effects on trade direction
Indonesia -0.01 0.28 0.63 0.18 0.45 0.00
Malaysia 0.50 -0.00 0.63 0.16 0.45 -0.00
Philippines 0.50 0.28 -0.00 0.18 0.45 0.00
Singapore 0.50 0.26 0.62 -0.01 0.44 -0.00
Thailand 0.50 0.27 0.63 0.18 -0.00 0.00
ROW 0.07 -0.15 0.20 -0.25 0.02 -0.12
Note: The unilateral trade 1iberaiization of the ASEAN member
countries would increase total intra-ASEAN trade by 25.5%.
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